Pramoedya Ananta Toer's "Arok of Java: A Novel of Early Indonesia"

Periplus Bookshop Kemang cordially invites you to join us in a celebration for the publication of Toer's latest English language publication.

We are going to have a meet and greet with Max Lane, the translator for this book.

And with our guest of honor, Ibu Pram and daughter - Titiek will also be attending. This event will be taking place on:

Day & date : Saturday, October 27, 2007

Time : 11 am – onwards

Venue : Komp. Villa Kemang (Hero Kemang)

Jl. Kemang Selatan 1 – South Jakarta

 

Book Description

It is the 13^th century in Java. Rebelliousness stirs among peasant farmers and Brahmin priests alike. Slavery has returned and men, women and children labour to find gold for Java's rulers. Bearing the symbols of spiritual power, a young scholar-bandit and rebel appears, called Arok – "he who upturns everything". As the rebellion spreads, it is Arok himself whom the rulers employ to suppress it. Thus emerges one of the epic political conspiracies of Javanese history. At stake is power in Java itself, the Lady Consort Dedes, and an end to slavery and oppression.

This novel presents Pramoedya's version of a great legend emerging out of the mists of historical past, is a tale of palace politics, conspiracy and revolution. It sets out the beginning of historical process that began on Java and gives the most vivid picture of the political, cultural and social forces which Pramoedya sees as having remained crucial until even today: the castes of the Brahman intellectuals, the Satria military and the Sudra, the people, the farmers, the artisans and labourers.

About the Author

Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) was born in Blora, central Java, the eldest son a headmaster and activist. He wrote more than 40 works, including novels, short stories, plays, history, literary criticism and more than 400 newspaper essays. His Buru Tetrology has been hailed as a brilliant work of epic historical fiction.

Pramoedya is survived by his second wife, Maemunah, with whom he had five children. He had three children from his first marriage, 16 grandchildren and three great-grandchildren.

For further information please contact:

Tessa

Marketing & Communications
PERIPLUS BOOKINDO

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Email: teresa@javabooks.co.id

Sekelumit Cerita di Balik Penyusunan Tesaurus Bahasa Indonesia

dari: Forum Pembaca Kompas

Awal Desember 2006 yang lalu terbit, Tesaurus Bahasa Indonesia(TBI)â€"agaknya karya pertama dalam sejarah dari jenis ini. Buku yang diterbitkan Gramedia ini mendapat sambutan yang cukup bagus. Dalam waktu singkat, ia sudah mengalami cetak ulang.

Yang menarik, tesaurus setebal 736 halaman ini dikerjakan seorang diri. Penyusunnya Eko Endarmoko, anggota redaksi Jurnal Kebudayaan Kalam (sekarang on-line) di Komunitas Utan Kayu, Jakarta.

Eko Endarmoko, yang pemalu dan pendiam ini, baru sekarang menceritakan pengalamannya menyusun karya yang sulit dan bertahun-tahun dikerjakan ini.

Tesaurus ini adalah buah dari dorongan terus-menerus akan keperluan mendapatkan kata paling jitu sewaktu merangkai kalimat. Hampir separuh kandungan tesaurus itu berasal dari setumpuk carikan kertas berisi kata-kata bersinonim yang saya catat berdikit-dikit sejak kuliah di tahun 1980-an. Kira-kira sepuluh tahun kemudian, demi lebih cepat mendapatkan sesuatu kata sekaligus mencegah carikan-carikan kertas tadi berceceran, semua catatan tadi lalu saya garap dengan program pengolah kata.

Niat membukukannya, yang muncul sesudah melihat seluruh bentuk kasarnya terketik di layar, terdesak dan bahkan sempat terlupakan beberapa lamanya, oleh rutinitas kerja sebagai penyunting di penerbit Pustaka Utama Grafiti.

Sekitar pertengahan tahun 1997, yaitu saat saya mulai bergabung dalam Jurnal Kebudayaan Kalam, adalah momen penting yang memungkinkan TBI menemukan bentuknya seperti sekarang. Jurnal Kalam, Teater Utan Kayu, dan Galeri Lontarâ€"ketiganya merupakan sayap kesenian Komunitas Utan Kayuâ€"tak lain dari apa yang biasa diringkas dengan sebutan TUK atau Teater Utan Kayu.

Rekan-rekan saya, para kurator-sastrawan di sana, Nirwan Dewanto, Sitok Srengenge, Hasif Amini (dan sebelum ini: Ayu Utami), memerhatikan persoalan bahasa Indonesia dengan tekun, cerewet, dan bersemangat. Bekerja sama dengan mereka memberi rangsangan tersendiri bagi saya untuk meneruskan penyusunan tesaurus ini, sekalipun praktis kami cuma berkumpul sekali seminggu, tiap Rabu, antara lain untuk rapat menyusun program acara tiga bulan ke depan.

Bekerja di TUK atau KUK memang setengah "kerja sukarelawan". Maka tiap orang punya kegiatan samping. Kegiatan samping saya adalah menjadi penyunting bahasa, antara lain bagi terjemahan yang akan diterbitkan oleh lembaga KITLV (Koninklijke Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde) Belanda yang di Jakarta diwakili Jaap Erkelens. Bung Jaap sering datang ke Kedai Tempo dan kami duduk berdua bekerja di depan tumpukan naskah. Bung Jaap dengan demikian juga jadi bagian dari KUK, sebagaimana tiap orang yang kerap datang dan bekerja di sana. Bahkan Bung Jaap pernah jadi "kurator" pameran karikatur pers Belanda dari masa revolusi Indonesia (Februari-Maret 2006).

Oleh KLTV juga, saya disponsori untuk kerja penelitian di Leiden, Belanda, selama Mei-Agustus 2001 dalam menyiapkan TBI. Saya senang rekan-rekan di TUK merelakan, bahkan mendorong, saya meninggalkan kerja selama itu. Saya harap hasil kerja itu tidak mengecewakan.

Memahami Aceh dalam Kerumitan Indonesia

Koran Tempo - Jum'at, 19 Oktober 2007

Opini

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, peneliti senior pada Imparsial, Jakarta

Sekarang lebih mudah memahami Aceh ketimbang Indonesia. Berbeda dengan dahulu, lebih mudah memahami Indonesia--yang akhirnya berkembang menjadi permakluman politik--daripada memahami Aceh, yang kemudian melahirkan resistansi politik.

Mungkin karena Aceh adalah dunia mikro, dan Indonesia adalah dunia makro, lebih mudahlah memahami Aceh daripada memahami Indonesia. Namun, antropolog Clifford Geertz telah mengingatkan tentang Aceh yang cenderung ekstrover sehingga cenderung bergerak evolutif. Sedangkan Indonesia--akibat dominasi budaya Indonesia Dalam yang agraris dan membatin--cenderung introver dan bergerak involutif.

Seturut itulah, Aceh lebih mudah dipahami karena kemikroannya, sifatnya yang ekstrover, dan geraknya yang evolutif. Indonesia tentunya semakin susah--kalau belum memusingkan--dipahami karena kemakroannya, sifatnya yang introver, dan geraknya yang involutif.

Singkatnya, anatomi Aceh itu sederhana. Anatomi Indonesia itu rumit. Namun, bukankah, pasca-Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Helsinki, Aceh berada dalam Indonesia? Karena itu, apakah cukup memadai untuk memahami kesederhanaan Aceh tanpa kaitannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia?

Tengoklah laporan International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Komplikasi Pasca-Konflik". Kiranya ini sebuah contoh yang ideal bagaimana memahami kesederhanaan Aceh tanpa kaitannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia. Anatomi Aceh--yang diwakili oleh kajian tentang evolusi Gerakan Aceh Merdeka dan Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA)--demikian lancar diuraikan tanpa mengaitkannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia, serta dengan mudah dapat diramalkan bagaimana jadinya di esok hari.

ICG melaporkan, pasca-MOU Helsinki, ada ketenangan di Jakarta, dan terjadi kegelisahan yang semakin kuat di Aceh perihal masa depan perdamaian yang sedang dilangsungkan. Pasalnya sederhana saja, yakni menyangkut evolusi dalam tubuh GAM dan BRA. Dan kedua kelembagaan ini dikendalikan oleh orang GAM. Meskipun ICG mengakui orang GAM bukan pelaku satu-satunya yang menggelisahkan, anatomi pelaku lain tak juga diuraikan oleh ICG. Mungkin terlalu rumit.

Transformasi politik yang berdampak sosial yang terjadi pasca-pemilihan kepala daerah (pilkada) yang digelar sejak Desember 2006 digambarkan oleh ICG dengan terang-benderang dan sederhana bahwa "para pemilih di Aceh tampaknya telah mengganti elite korup yang satu dengan yang lain". Pejabat baru melahirkan jaringan patronase baru.

Perihal patronase baru bukanlah hal yang unik. Di mana pun dunia politik hidup dan mengalami pembaharuan, baik secara demokratis maupun nondemokratis, pastilah melahirkan jaringan patronase baru yang seturut dengan penguasa baru. Dalam sejarah kesultanan Aceh, setiap muncul sultan dan sultanah baru, apalagi dari wangsa baru, dengan segera terbentuk jaringan patronase baru. Dalam sejarah Indonesia, begitu Soeharto menjatuhkan Soekarno, maka segala jaringan patronase Soekarno dihancurkan dan dibentuk jaringan patronase yang Soeharto-sentris. Sejarawan Ong telah menguraikan keniscayaan sejarah tentang kemunculan kaum orang kaya baru setelah kemunculan penguasa baru.

Hal penting lain yang tak pernah dikaji adalah bahwa pilkada Aceh itu telah memutuskan dominasi oligarki partai nasional yang sudah selaras dengan pelaku birokrasi dan militer sejak masa Orde Baru. Ternyata, klaim politik bahwa hanya partai politik nasional, birokrasi, dan serdadu yang bisa melahirkan pemimpin tidak sepenuhnya benar. Gerakan protes juga bisa melahirkan pemimpin yang bisa terpilih oleh rakyat. Klaim politik hitam bahwa uang adalah modal utama untuk menjadi penguasa politik juga salah. Klaim politik kampanye dengan mobilisasi massa yang sebesar mungkin dengan umbul-umbul politik yang mengepung rakyat--sehingga membutuhkan dana politik yang besar--juga salah. Aliansi antarpartai atau membeli partai sebagai tunggangan politik juga kalah.

Di satu sisi, kita bisa membaca peristiwa itu sebagai sebuah reintegrasi Aceh, dan khususnya GAM, ke dalam sistem politik Indonesia. Lalu, kita bisa berkata-kata: itukah perpolitikan Aceh yang berbeda dengan perpolitikan Indonesia? Di sisi lain, kita pun dapat memahami peristiwa itu sebagai sebentuk revolusi politik. Paling tidak lebih revolusioner daripada capaian politik yang diperoleh dari gerakan Reformasi 1998 secara nasional.

Akibat perubahan politik yang revolusioner itu--sekalipun baru pada tataran pelakunya, belum masuk ke revolusi struktur dan kultur politik di Aceh-- keseluruhan sendi kehidupan di Aceh menjadi goyah. Kaum elite lama khawatir terjungkal. Sebagian besar rakyat yang merasa menang atas dominasi kaum elite lama menggelembungkan harapan hidup barunya pada pemimpin yang baru.

Celakanya, pilkada juga bisa berarti menjebloskan penguasa baru itu ke dalam struktur dan kultur politik, birokrasi, dan keserdaduan yang telah mengakar dengan rumit, yang juga adalah refleksi dari keberhasilan Indonesianisasi di Aceh. Masalahnya, apakah para pelaku politik dari pihak GAM, yang sekarang terintegrasi ke dalam struktur dan kultur politik keindonesiaan itu, mampu mengubah atau justru tenggelam di dalam kerumitan Indonesia.

Dalam perancangan anggaran, penguasa baru belum berhasil merancang sistem anggaran belanja yang sesuai dengan visi dan misinya. Kaum teknokrat dan birokrat yang mendominasi penganggaran masih menyusunnya sesuai dengan mindset yang tak sensitif terhadap kondisi Aceh pascakonflik dan bencana tsunami. Dalam restrukturisasi pemerintahan Aceh, penguasa baru terbentur dengan cara berpikir kaum politikus di parlemen lokal yang tidak melihat Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh sebagai acuan utamanya. Bahkan mereka disekongkoli oleh kaum birokrat yang khawatir terjungkal.

Untuk melihat lebih jauh bagaimana kesederhanaan Aceh didominasi oleh kerumitan Indonesia, Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA) merupakan contoh idealnya. Pada aras politik, penanggung jawab utama seluruh reintegrasi berada di pundak pemerintah RI, baik yang menyangkut GAM maupun korban (rakyat sipil). Hal itu dibunyikan dengan kalimat, "Pemerintah RI dan pemerintah Aceh akan melakukan upaya? Pemerintah RI akan mengalokasikan dana? Pemerintah RI akan mengalokasikan tanah pertanian dan dana?" MOU juga menjelaskan dengan terang benderang apa saja dan siapa saja yang menjadi subyek reintegrasi itu.

Namun, dalam aras implementasinya terjadi dua hal yang merumitkan. Pertama, BRA adalah sebuah lembaga yang dibentuk oleh pemerintah Aceh, bukan oleh pemerintah RI sehingga kewenangannya sulit menjangkau langit-langit kebijakan politik nasional. Beban nasional dilimpahkan menjadi beban daerah, meskipun dengan alokasi dana dari anggaran nasional (APBN). Agenda reintegrasi pun berkelindan dengan agenda dinas sosial.

Kedua, kerumitan semakin menjadi, ketika BRA dibebani hal-hal di luar mandat MOU Helsinki. BRA harus menanggulangi para milisi yang merupakan subyek tak tersebutkan dalam MOU Helsinki. Bahkan BRA menjadi saluran dana bagi Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi (FKK), yang merupakan evolusi dari Desk Aceh di masa perang yang berelasi dengan Menteri Koordinator Politik Hukum dan Keamanan. Hal ini terjadi setelah FKK melibatkan keanggotaan pemimpin GAM di dalamnya. BRA pun tak berdaya memperoleh akuntabilitas pemakaian dana itu dari FKK. Lebih rumit lagi bila benar bahwa pembentukan FKK merupakan siasat politik menyabotase pembentukan Komisi Bersama Penyelesaian Klaim, yang diamanatkan MOU Helsinki namun belum juga dibentuk, sedangkan permasalahan semakin rumit.

Hal lain yang semakin merumitkan adalah pemerintah RI tidak berupaya membuat agenda reintegrasi yang terancang dengan baik (blueprint) bagi Aceh-Indonesia pascaperang. Pertarungan politik internal dibiarkan dan ketidakpuasan para subyek BRA terus menggelembung.

Tampaknya, contoh-contoh di atas sudah cukup untuk menjelaskan bagaimana kerumitan-kerumitan Indonesia yang semakin mengepung Aceh, yang merupakan produk dari pengabaian komitmen-komitmen politiknya sebagaimana yang tercantum dalam MOU. Situasi pun semakin rumit manakala tanggung jawab pemerintah RI untuk memfasilitasi transformasi GAM dari gerakan bersenjata menjadi gerakan politik tidak dilakukan. Apalagi para donor yang terlibat dalam memfasilitasi pemerintahan Aceh maupun GAM sama sekali tidak memahami apa dan bagaimana kesederhanaan Aceh dan kerumitan Indonesia itu. Sementara itu, pelaku-pelaku politik baru di Aceh mulai kehilangan kesadaran akan kesederhanaan Aceh dan mulai terseret ke dalam alam kerumitan Indonesia

Pornography: The Production and Consumption of Inequality (Paperback)

Book Review

by Gil Dines, Robert Jensen, Ann Russo

A must read for EVERYONE, June 9, 2003

By
Kevin Davis (Charlotte, NC United States) - See all my reviews

I say this is a must for everyone because pornography effects everyone (whether you use it or not). This is an honest look into the world of pornography including the producers, consumers, and victims. Since it was written by 3 outspoken liberal feminists (e.g., one author claims to be anti-capitalist, and they all dismiss religious conservatives such as fundamentalists as often hypocritical; not to mention, they make a point of naming the Catholic religion of many of the users and abusers of porn). Even with those quibbles (since I'm a conservative/fundamentalist Baptist, pro-capitalist, and for the most part, anti-feminist), I still highly recommend this book. Beware, however: the illustrations of mainstream porn and the accounts of the victims are very graphic. For those of us who never "got into" the world of hardcore or semi-hardcore pornography, this will be an eye-opener that will make you both sad and disgusted. If you don't have the money to buy this book, please go see if your library has it (like mine). A must read no matter where you are on the left-right social/political spectrum.

In Memoriam Marianne Katoppo: Kepergian "Yang Lain" Itu

Oleh Aryawirawan Simauw

Sabtu siang tanggal 13 Oktober 2007, di tengah keriangan Idul Fitri, angin sepoi-sepoi terasa sendu di Krematorium Oasis Lestari, Tangerang. Pada sebuah oven, jasad Marianne Katoppo dalam dua jam telah menjadi abu berwarna putih. Kesenduan dan keheningan bersatu menghantar Marianne berpulang menuju Sang Khalik. Tak ada suara kucing-kucing yang mengantarnya, mahluk hidup yang selama bertahun-tahun menjadi teman setianya. Tak ada isak-tangis yang berkepanjangan. Suasana sunyi dan teduh, sesunyi dan seteduh hidupnya. Kepergiannya begitu lain. Sepi, sunyi, damai, dan indah.

Sejumlah kalangan yang mendengar kabar berpulangnya Marianne seakan tak percaya. Bagi saya, kepergiannya sangat mengagetkan dan menyesakkan dada. Sebab, seminggu sebelum Marianne berpulang, ia meminta saya datang menengoknya di Bogor, tapi saya tak bisa. Ironisnya, sesungguhnya sejak minggu lalu Marianne sudah setuju untuk menjadi penasihat penulisan cerita dalam film layar lebar yang sedang saya persiapkan, "Ashram Shanti". Sebuah film yang direncanakan diputar 8 Maret 2008, pada Hari Perempuan Internasional, dan sekaligus bagian dari hadiah HUT ke-65 Marianne.

Perempuan yang dilahirkan di Tomohon pada 9 Juni 1943 itu, memiliki sejumlah sahabat. Sejak 1989, saya membangun persahabatan dengannya, melanjutkan persahabatan ayah dan ibu saya. Bersamaan dengan menguatnya tekanan rezim Orde Baru, Marianne adalah sosok pemberani yang luar biasa.

Mungkin tidak banyak yang tahu, bahwa dalam fase perubahan dari 1990 hingga 1998, Marianne memberikan kontribusi bagi percepatan reformasi secara tak langsung. Tulisan-tulisannya di Suara Pembaruan dalam fase itu dan kehadiran di berbagai forum internasional serta kenekatannya mendirikan Forum Demokrasi (1991) bersama Gus Dur dkk adalah kontribusinya yang cerdas.

Marianne yang menulis buku Compassionate and Free pada 1979 dan telah memberi pencerahan di mana-mana, memilih teologi perempuan sebagai teologi pembebasannya. Gelar Sarjana Teologi dari STT Jakarta tidak membuatnya sungkan untuk beradu pandangan dengan teman-teman teolog Indonesia lainnya yang Strata II dan Strata III.

Sebab, dengan kemampuan lebih dari 10 bahasa, penguasaan pengetahuan filsafat, sejarah, politik, sosial, dan ekonomi, Marianne dikenal kalangan luas. Ia juga terlibat berbagai organisasi, mulai dari sebagai anggota Pengurus Pusat Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (1962-1964, 1976-1978), pendiri Kelompok Hapus Hukuman Mati (1980), anggota Pendiri Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologian in Indonesia (1982), anggota United Borad for Christian Education in Asia (1982-1986), anggota Majelis Pekerja Harian Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (1984-1989), dan anggota International Council of World Conference for Religion and Peace (1989-1994).

Teman-temannya bukan saja dari kalangan Protestan, tetapi Katolik dan Ortodoks. Demikian pula dari kalangan Islam, Hindu, Buddha, Khonghucu, Sikh, Brahmana Kumaris, dan Bahai. Keterlibatannya pada pergumulan pluralisme, multikulturalisme dan theologiae religionum tetap pada pilihannya pada teologia perempuan sebagai paradigma berteologia.

 

Realitas Kemanusiaan

Dalam buku peringatan 50 Tahun Sekolah Tinggi Teologia Jakarta tahun 1984, dengan jelas Marianne mengatakan bahwa diperlukan paradigma baru dalam berteologi, yaitu realitas kemanusiaan dan bukan lagi sekadar pewahyuan dari Allah. Marianne sangat yakin harusnya realitas kemanusiaan yang terpecah sekarang ini dan menghasilkan kemiskinan, ketidakadilan, ketidakdamaian, kerusakan lingkungan menjadi titik-tolak berteologia agama-agama dalam menyelesaikan persoalan kekinian kita.

Teriakannya yang keras tentang konsep Imago Dei dalam memperjuangkan kesetaraan, persamaan, pemulihan kemanusiaan, dan hubungan yang hancur dimampatkan dalam konsepnya tentang Liberation Theology Toward Full Humanity. Dan baginya, tugas ini bukan melulu pada satu agama tertentu, tetapi pada agama-agama. Oleh karena itu, selain dikenal sebagai perintis pikiran teologi perempuan di Asia, Marianne juga menggunakan teologia perempuan sebagai karya-karya pembebasan bagi agama-agama menemukan kembali fungsinya sebagai pembebas.

Dalam ranah yang lain, Marianne juga dikenal sebagai seorang novelis dengan kekayaan tema perempuan yang menyentuh. Sebutlah "Dunia Tak Bermusim" (1976), "Raumanen" (1977), dan "Rumah Di Atas Jembatan" (1981). Bahkan novelnya "Raumanen" diganjar Hadiah Yayasan Buku Utama (1978) dan SEA Write Award (1982). Konon, latar kisah dalam novel-novelnya banyak diambil dari pengalaman hidupnya dan teman-temannya. Selain itu, Marianne menerjemahkan karya sastra dari bahasa aslinya ke bahasa Indonesia. Misalnya "Lapar" (Knut Hamsun, Norwegia), "Malam dan Fajar" (Elie Wiesel, Prancis) dan antologi cerpen India dan Thailand.

Namun, karya terbesarnya adalah buku Compassionate and Free. Buku ini ditulis Mei 1979, selama satu bulan dalam bahasa Inggris untuk kepentingan Dewan Gereja-gereja se Dunia. Buku ini telah membawa banyak pencerahan di kalangan perempuan, komunitas dan lembaga di dunia. Seorang teman saya bercerita bahwa ketika mengikuti sebuah workshop teologi feminis, oleh banyak perempuan Marianne dianggap sebagai inspirasi mereka. Juga bagi beberapa peserta dari negara-negara Timur Tengah.

Setelah 28 tahun buku ini ditulis, diterjemahkan ke berbagai bahasa, dipakai sebagai text book mata kuliah teologi feminis, baru pada tahun ini diterjemahkan dalam bahasa Indonesia, diterbitkan oleh sejumlah sahabat perempuannya. Dalam perjalanan pulang kami semua berujar, bahwa setelah 28 tahun bukunya dibungkam di Indonesia dan raga Marianne telah tiada, buku ini menjadi momentum kebangkitan teologi perempuan Indonesia.

Saat ini, Marianne telah tiada. Marianne tahu masih banyak perempuan yang acap dianggap tak ada, tak perlu ada, dan tak lagi ada. Dianggap "yang lain" itu. Tetapi Marianne telah berhasil menyatakan: "Saya mengklaim hak perempuan untuk dibebaskan dari yang Lain yang mengancam itu. Saya menuntut hak perempuan menjadi Yang Lain dalam seluruh kepenuhannya dan dengan berbagai karunianya–Yang Lain, yang bukan merupakan lawan, deviasi, subordinat dari Diri, melainkan dia yang memberikan makna pada Diri". Perempuan "Yang Lain" itu telah tiada, dengan kematian "Yang Lain", tapi kini perjuangan menjadi Diri "pasti lain" jadinya! Marianne, kami akan lanjutkan perjuanganmu!

Penulis adalah pekerja seni, hiburan, media dan penyiaran; pendamping orang dengan HIV/AIDS; pendamping perempuan korban kekerasan

Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia

Journal article by Zachary Abuza; Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
29, 2007

Review

Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia. By Noorhaidi Hasan. New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006. Softcover: 266pp.

The first time that I met Umar Jafaar Thalib, the first thing that I noticed about him was that he had delicate manicured hands, an eerie juxtaposition to all the bloodshed for which he was responsible. Yet reading through Noorhaidi Hasan's Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia--the first book-length study that charts the decline and fall of one of the most visible symbols of post-Soeharto Islamic militancy--one gets little sense of the sheer brutality or scope of violence that plagued Indonesia's Outer Islands from 1999 to 2002. Much of the violence gets glossed over and many parts of the book are frustrating because very little attention is given to such critical points. But the book, which was based on 18 months of fieldwork and 125 interviews of members of Laskar Jihad, remains a wealth of information.

The book in many ways is much more of an intellectual history of the Salafi movement within Indonesia, and in particular, Jafaar's quest to become the movement's paramount leader. Chapter 4, for example, simply explains the Salafi ideology as it took root in Indonesia. The book begins with an analysis of the rapid emergence of Salafi mosques, madrassa, and halqa' ("study circles"). It ties in local politics with the expansion of Saudi Arabian geopolitics and explains the emergence of what he considers a "new type" of Salafi students, in particular, those who went through Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (LIPIA). Under the constraints of the New Order regime, the nascent Salafi movement in Indonesia was forced to focus on what it considers to be its core mission: da'wah, and eschewing politics and militancy.

Hasan's argument is that the Salafi movement, perhaps more than any other movement in Indonesia, was highly influenced by exogenous factors: the Afghan war, Gulf charity funding, and the first Gulf war.

As Soeharto's legitimacy waned in the 1990s with economic slowdowns and rampant corruption, he turned to the Islamists for support--a move that gave the Salafi movement more space. Yet the Salafi movement remained woefully disparate throughout the 1990s. Hasan explains both the doctrinal schisms and personality contests that kept the Salafis divided (pp. 54-58). To that end, Jafaar turned to the Saudi Arabian Hai'at Kibar al-Ulama (the Committee of Senior Ulama) led by Bin Baz to issue fatwas justifying Thalib's actions, and hence his authority--a tactic Thalib would use again in the coming years to crush his rivals in the Salafi movement (pp. 58-61).

Following a rift within the global Salafi movement over the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia in 1991, Thalib began publishing Salary in 1996, which became his ideological mouthpiece. Hasan argues: "There is little doubt that the monthly Salafy quickly reinforced Thalib's image as a leading Salafi authority in Indonesia" (p. 85). Salafy was followed by a network of pasentren, Ihyaus Sunnah Network, though which Thalib fell out of favour and was ousted.

The move from quietest activities into political activism, always a wedge within the Salafi community between the strict Salafis and the Ikhwanists and Surusist, is charted in Chapter 3. As Hasan notes: "The dramatic shift of the Salafi movement towards political activism and militancy was inseparable from the political ambitions of the movement's leaders who saw that the rapid changes in the Indonesian political landscape would facilitate the orchestration of popular politics and the staging of collective actions" (p. 93). While some of the opening came from the rise of Islamist political leaders following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, Hasan contends that it was the outbreak of sectarian conflicts that gave the Salafis not just the political opening, but a religious obligation to act--both a personal obligation (fard ayn) and a collective obligation (fard kifaya).

Thalib with other Salafis established Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wah' Jama'ah, the umbrella organization for Laskar Jihad.

Forum Komunikasi questioned the "indifference" of the government to the plight of the Muslims in the Malukus (p. 209), and in particular to President Abdurrahman Wahid's coddling of Christians, communists, and his desire to forge diplomatic relations with Israel. For the conspiracy-minded Thalib, the Malukan conflict was something escalated by a Zionist-American conspiracy to rip apart the Indonesian state (p. 114). Here again, Thalib relied on the fatwas of no less than six leading Salafi clerics in the Middle East to justify the Laskar Jihad's jihad in the Malukus (pp. 116-21). Those fatwas were used to declare President Wahid, the former leader of Nadhalatul Ulama, the world's largest Muslim organization, a kafir (infidel), who had abdicated his responsibility to defend Muslims from aggression. And in doing so, Hasan contends that the Salafis "appointed Thalib as temporary commander of their jihad mission" and ergo "temporary leader whose commands should be followed" (p. 155). Thalib's quest to become the amir of the Salafi movement was one step closer to fulfilment.

Despite extensive fieldwork and interviews, Laskar Jihad is not a quantitative study, but it sheds particular light on the process of exclusion and establishing parallel communities, cut off from secular society, what Hasan labels "enclaves". The author demonstrates how the leaders of Laskar Jihad encouraged members to live apart in terms of dress, norms, behaviour, and language, "a domain in which a resistance identity is created" (p. 181). While he admits that the public sphere of the Salafi movement "belongs only to men" (p. 180), there is little discussion of women's role within Forum Komunikasi and the Salafi community.

The 6 April 2000 meeting in Jakarta between three Laskar Jihad leaders and President Wahid, who refused to sanctify their vigilante defence of the Muslims in the Malukus, marked the start of armed conflict.

Laskar Jihad began military training. Some members of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) appear to have assisted in this process, but what Hasan fails to demonstrate is why the Indonesian government allowed Laskar Jihad to continue the training and then board government-owned ships bound for Ambon, an event that dramatically escalated the violence. The TNI's complicity in supporting Laskar Jihad's activities in Malukus must be understood in the context of what was happening in East Timor, a subject that goes completely unexplained. Far more on the role and involvement of the TNI needs to be researched.

Hasan argues that Laskar Jihad added little to the battlefield in terms of tactics or military skills; indeed, their "achievement in the Moluccas was, in many ways, strikingly limited" (p. 197). In general, Laskar Jihad was there to set up Koranic centres and to take control of abandoned mosques. Hasan rightly notes that much of the fighting was done by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked Laskar Mujahidin, and some foreign fighters, though he explains little about these groups or how they were related with Laskar Jihad. Indeed, there was often significant tension between them.

The March 2001 stoning to death of a member who committed rape was a turning point in the organization. Thalib used his religious authority, again based on a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia, to  implement shariah, rather than simply calling on followers to obey it. He became known not only as a jihad leader, but also as one of the vanguard who supported comprehensive implementation of the shariah. It was as though he had challenged those who had previously spoken out about the need to return to the Jakarta Charter to step forward and prove their commitment to Islam (p. 199).

Yet again, while explaining the actions and implications, Hasan glosses over what happened on the part of the state: "Partly because of the demands of the aforementioned Muslim organizations, the police released Thalib and changed his legal status to that of house detainee. Following the pre-judicial trial, which determined that his arrest was illegal, the police eventually absolved Thalib of all indictments" (p. 199). This is hardly a convincing and satisfactory answer to why someone who unilaterally challenged the authority of the state was able to literally get away with murder. Likewise, Hasan is really unable to explain why it took the state so long to send troops to the Malukus, in August 2001, though his analysis of the repercussions on Laskar Jihad is quite strong.

There are a few factual errors regarding the JI in his discussion of the post-9/11 environment. There were no arrests of JI members until after the 12 October Bali bombings; indeed the Indonesian government was in an appalling state of denial regarding the scope of Islamic militancy within its borders. Likewise, the author overstates the popularity and resilience of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) which has been in significant retreat since 9/11, as other militant groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defender's Front) have intimidated its members, while the quasi-official Ulama's Council of Indonesia (MUI) have issued fatwas branding "liberal Islam" un-Islamic (p. 208).

There are other places that simply begged for a more thorough treatment and analysis. The jihad in Poso got only a paragraph (p. 205), yet the violence continues there to this day, as it does in the Malukus. While the author contends that Laskar Jihad had scant involvement there, the conclusion would have been an apt place to discuss the ongoing legacy of Laskar Jihad. While the group disbanded under the weight of internal factionalism and Thalib's rapid fall from grace, discussed in pages 211-13, the legacy of militant Islam continues to this day. The Indonesian government's apparent reluctance to take on these small laskar groups is troubling.

All too often groups such as Laskar Jihad and the FPI are dismissed as thugs. Hasan's work is integral to our understanding of the profoundly theological nature of these groups. He explains the theological debates and schisms with clarity and consistency. Despite some limitations as mentioned above, Laskar Jihad is very balanced and eminently readable, and will remain the standard reference on the group. It should be read by anyone interested in Islamic militancy in Indonesia.

ZACHARY ABUZA is a Professor in the Department of Political Science
and International Relations, Simmons College, Boston, USA.

The Burmese Way to Fascism

---

Far Eastern Economic Review - October 2007

by Bertil Lintner 

If Karl Marx was right that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce, Burma is still stuck in the tragedy phase. The protests and crackdown in Rangoon in recent days are reprising the doomed democracy movement of 1988. As time passes and the security forces succeed in cowing the population, the world's outrage gives way to ineffectual responses and then resignation.

HARRY HARRISON

In the initial euphoria that such mass movements inevitably bring, the Western media dubbed this Burma's saffron revolution, comparing it to the peaceful "color revolutions" of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. So named because of the leading role played by Buddhist monks, the movement seemed destined to sweep away the unpopular military regime that has impoverished a country once among the wealthiest in Asia. The moral authority of the clergy, combined with the flow of information to the outside world facilitated by new technology, stoked the sense of optimism. The U.S. imposed tougher sanctions, while even China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, not normally known for putting pressure on their neighbors, issued strong statements.

However, the reality is that nothing substantive has changed since 1988. In fact, the Burmese regime is arguably stronger than it has ever been. It is well prepared to weather this new storm of domestic and international criticism.

The survival of successive military regimes in Burma is one of the enigmas of Southeast Asian politics. The key to this puzzle is understanding that Rangoon is no "ordinary" military dictatorship, and it cannot be compared with Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or other countries in the region which also have had spells of military rule.

When the army first seized power in Burma in 1962, it not only took control over the government, but also assumed economic power.

Branded the "Burmese Way to Socialism," this meant that almost all private property was confiscated and handed over to a number of military-run state corporations. The old mercantile elite, which to a large extent was of ethnic Indian and Chinese origin, left the country, and so did many of Burma's intellectuals. Prior to the 1962 coup, Burma had had one of the highest living standards in Southeast Asia, and a fairly well-educated population. But thereafter the military became the only elite.

The Burmese military establishment also developed into a state-within-a-state, a society where army personnel, their families and dependents enjoy a position far more privileged than their counterparts ever had in, for instance, Thailand and Indonesia. In both those countries, some degree of pluralism was always accepted even during the darkest years of military dictatorship.

After the last uprising in 1988, the Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 uprising, perhaps in an attempt to appease the international community, which had condemned the carnage in Rangoon, but also because the military had realized that they could make more money in a free-market economy. Private enterprise and foreign investment were permitted after the bloody events of 1988, when at least 3,000 protesters were gunned down, but, in essence, the Burmese Way to Capitalism is also a military-dominated economy.

There are few major enterprises which are not directly or indirectly controlled by the military, or by businessmen affiliated with the military, like the powerful, 43-year-old tycoon Tay Za, who is close to junta leader Gen. Than Shwe and his family. His Htoo Trading Company was one of two main contractors that built Burma's new administrative capital, Naypyidaw. The other was the Asia World Group, which is headed by Tun Myint Naing, or Steven Law, the son of Lo Hsing-han, who in the 1970s was branded by U.S. authorities as the king of opium in Burma's sector of the Golden Triangle.

In Burma, there are special schools and hospitals for the military and their dependents. They live in secluded, subsidized housing and shop for goods that are not available in ordinary stores. An army pass assures the holder of a seat on a train or an airplane, and a policeman would never dare to report him or her for violating traffic rules. The military's only civilian support base is the Union Solidarity and Development Association, USDA, which was formed in 1992. It claims to have 21 million members, but that is mainly because membership is compulsory for civil servants and ordinary citizens are forced to join. Like the Burma Socialist Program Party, BSPP, which ruled Burma until the 1988 uprising, it is a colossus on feet of clay, which, in the wake of current events, is likely to collapse, as the BSPP did 19 years ago.

The rise of military power in Burma began shortly after independence from Britain on Jan. 4, 1948. Communist as well as ethnic rebel armies rose in rebellion against Rangoon, and, in the northeast, remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong's communists. At independence, the Burmese army was only 15,000 strong, plus militias. But by 1955, because of the civil war, the ranks of the army had increased to 40,000, and it was already involved in businesses such as shipping, banking and publishing. When the emerging state-within-a-state gobbled up the state in 1962, there were 104,200 men in all three services. That rose to 140,000 in 1976, 160,000 in 1985, and, at the time of the 1988 uprising, 180,000 in the army and nearly 200,000 in all three services.

Today, the strength of the three services is estimated at 400,000, and they are much better equipped than at any time in Burma's modern history, mainly due to massive procurement of arms from China. The latest expansion comes at a time when the ruling military has managed to strike cease-fire agreements with most of the country's rebel groups, so, during the past decade, there has been very little fighting in Burma's traditionally volatile frontier areas. The enemy now is the population at large.

China's support is a key factor in the junta's staying power, and Beijing wants "stability," not a regime change. In January this year, China—along with Russia—used its veto power to block a U.S. and U.K.- sponsored resolution in the U.N. Security Council, although a majority of U.N. members had voted in favor. The Chinese insisted that the Burmese regime did not a pose a threat to regional security and, therefore, the Security Council was not the right forum to pass resolutions on political repression in Burma. Not even appeals by activists for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics seem to have swayed China into being more critical of the Burmese regime. China has not reacted to pictures from the carnage in Rangoon showing Burmese soldiers carrying Chinese-made T-56 automatic assault rifles.

It may be argued that Chinese military aid is of little help in quelling urban unrest. But the modernization of Burma's armed forces since 1988 has also served the purpose of ensuring the loyalty of the military, which is crucial for the survival of the present regime. Nothing is going to change as long as the military remains united, and there have so far been no credible reports of splits within the military. Given the abuse of power, their privileges and the atrocities they have committed, the Burmese military has everything to lose and nothing to gain from allowing more openness and transparency. Foreign-based opposition groups like to talk about "dialogue" and "national reconciliation," but these are no more than popular buzzwords with little relevance inside Burma, where the military talks to no one but itself.

A Rangoon-based Western diplomat once put it to me quite bluntly: "They fear that if they don't hang together, they'll hang separately." The junta is now reading from its standard playbook, blaming the "disturbances" on "internal and external destructionists." In a speech on Sept. 24, Burma's religious affairs minister, Brig.-Gen. Thura Myint Maung, asserted that "political extremists" from the pro-democracy National League for Democracy, NLD, "remnants" of the Communist Party of Burma (which has been defunct for more than 18 years), and foreign broadcasting stations had instigated Buddhist monks and others to demonstrate. The situation, he said, was being handled "softly" and "with care."

Meanwhile, the National League for Democracy, formed shortly after the 1988 uprising, has been decimated. Its main leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has charisma but she remains under house arrest, and nearly the entire, original leadership of the NLD is either dead, in prison or has simply given up all political activity. Most young NLD activists have been imprisoned, cowed into submission, or have fled the country. Only a handful of elderly spokespersons remain, and none of them has the strength and charisma to carry the party forward. That serves the interests of the junta, since the new-look NLD would appear to the outside world not to be a viable alternative.

Nor have external forces had much influence over Burma's ruling generals. Western sanctions have had minimal effect, as the country's neighbors—China, India and Asean—continue to trade and invest in the country, allowing the generals to use their ample natural resources and strategic geographical position to survive. China was the first major country to show interest in Burma's riches, even before the events of 1988. Pan Qi, former vice minister of communications, wrote an article in the Sept. 2, 1985 Beijing Review entitled "Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion," outlining the possibility of finding an outlet through Burma to the Indian Ocean for trade from China's landlocked provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. He mentioned the Burmese railheads of Myitkyina and Lashio in the northeast, and the Irrawaddy River, as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods.

By late 1991, Chinese experts were assisting in a series of infrastructure projects to spruce up the poorly maintained roads and railways. Chinese military advisers also arrived in the same year, the first foreign military personnel to be stationed in Burma since the Australians had a contingent there to train the Burmese army in the 1950s. The total value of Chinese arms deliveries to Burma is not known, but intelligence sources estimate it to be about $1.4 billion.

Burma's close relationship with China caused concern in India. To counter China's growing influence, at first India supported Burma's pro-democracy movement. But when it became clear that it was not going to come to power within the foreseeable future, India began to court the junta. Enticing Burma to distance itself from China, however, was not New Delhi's only concern; the rapidly expanding Indian economy needs energy, and Burma has ample resources of natural gas.

During the current turmoil, China blocked an attempt by the U.N. Security Council to adopt a binding resolution of Burma, while a spokesman for the Indian government on Sept. 26 made a rather bland statement: "The government of India is concerned at and is closely monitoring the situation in Myanmar (Burma). It is our hope that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue. India has always believed that Myanmar's process of political reform and national reconciliation should be more inclusive and broad-based."

Burma's generals are, therefore, firmly entrenched in power, and not overly worried about condemnation by the West. That doesn't mean that their position is entirely secure. They remain profoundly despised by the population at large and, last year, an entirely new movement began to take shape. It consisted of veterans of the 1988 uprising, the most prominent among them being Min Ko Naing, a student leader who was arrested in March 1989—and released only in November 2005, after nearly 16 years in solitary confinement. In 1988 he was a 26-year-old zoology student addressing crowds of tens of thousands in Rangoon. When he was released he was 42, and his years in prison had left their mark on his face and body. In 2005, he looked old and haggard—but his fighting spirit had not been quelled. "The people of Burma must have the courage to say `no' to injustice and `yes' to truth," he said at a meeting of the newly formed "88-Generation Students' Group" in Rangoon in August 2006.

Min Ko Naing's group played an important role in organizing the first protests in August, shortly after the authorities had increased the price of petrol and fuel, causing further hardships for a population that was already suffering from rising living costs. But the entire leadership of the group was arrested immediately, depriving the movement of direction. The monks, who took the initiative in the street marches which led to a renewed mass movement, can only mobilize people and take the moral high ground; as monks, they cannot be political leaders. Thus, unlike in 1988 when a number of political leaders emerged, among them Aung San Suu Kyi, the current movement is leaderless and rudderless.

The bitter reality is that nothing is going to change as long as the military remains united and willing to gun down its own people. A younger generation of army officers, who see the need to negotiate with the pro-democracy movement, is probably the only hope. But for now, no one is aware of any "young Turks" lurking in the wings, and there are no signs of serious cracks within the ranks. But if change does come to Burma, it will in any event be because of action taken by such younger army officers, not demonstrations led by monks. The protests can, at the most, influence sections of the army to realize that there is no future in supporting the present regime. But only time will tell if that is going to happen.

Mr. Lintner is a free-lance writer based in Thailand. He is the author of several books on Burma.

Dari Catatan Harian Imam Bonjol

Tempo - Edisi. 34/XXXVI/15 - 21 Oktober 2007

Iqra

Imam Bonjol meninggalkan sejumlah catatan hidupnya saat diasingkan. Ada catatan tentang jalannya pertempuran dan negosiasi dengan Belanda. Tak ada tentang kebrutalan.

"Ini ada surat kumpeni menyuruh saya datang kepada kumpeni sekarang. Bagaimana kiranya segala datuk-datuk atau baik saya pai (pergi—Red.) atau tidak?"

Imam Bonjol wafat di Manado. Selama di Manado, ia ternyata menulis semacam otobiografi dalam huruf Arab Melayu. Oleh anaknya, Naali Sutan Chaniago dan Haji Muhammad Amin, yang ikut dibuang ke Manado, naskah itu diselamatkan.

Dalam catatan itu, kita temukan kesaksian Imam Bonjol menyerang daerah-daerah yang belum menjalankan syariah, juga kisah bagaimana ia mengirim Tuanku Tambusai ke Mekkah, yang kemudian membuat Tambusai bergelar Haji Muhammad Saleh.

Atau bagaimana di sebuah salat Jumat, ia menyerukan hukum adat basandi syarak. Ia melukiskan dengan agak rinci betapa ganasnya perang mempertahankan benteng Bonjol. Tapi bagian paling panjang adalah pengakuannya bernegosiasi dengan Belanda.

Diceritakan, utusan Belanda, Kroner (Kolonel) Elout, memintanya menyerah. Ia menolak, lalu terjadi pertempuran sengit. Dikisahkannya ia memasang meriam sendiri untuk menggempur Belanda. Tapi benteng Bonjol jatuh, dan utusan datang lagi. Di Padang, ia bertemu dengan Residen Francis.

Resident Francis: Dulu saya minta Tuanku, Tuanku tidak mau datang bertemu kami….

Tuanku Imam Bonjol: Tempo tuan kirim surat yang dahulu tuan minta saya. Saya kasih lihat surat itu kepada raja-raja dan penghulu. Hampir saya dibunuh orang tempo itu dan dicabik-cabiknyo dek surat itu. Surat kemudian tidak kasih lihat pada penghulu. Maka itulah sekarang mencari tuan….

Imam Bonjol akhirnya mau dibawa kapal ke Betawi, Surabaya, Buton, Ambon, sampai Manado. Di sanalah, di Lotak Pineleng, ia tinggal sampai wafatnya. Keberadaan naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol pertama kali dilaporkan oleh Ph.S. van Ronkel dalam artikel Inlandsche getuigenissen aangaande de Padri-oorlog (Kesaksian Pribumi mengenai Perang Padri) dalam jurnal De Indische Gids, 1915.

Ronkel menyebutkan bahwa dia telah menyalin satu naskah berjudul Tambo Anak Tuanku Imam Bonjol setebal 318 halaman. Pada 2004, Sjafnir Aboe Nain dari Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Minangkabau, Padang, menerbitkan transliterasi naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol.

Kata pengantar yang ditulis Sjafnir menyebutkan bahwa salinan Ronkel itu sesungguhnya gabungan antara catatan Imam Bonjol yang berjumlah 191 halaman dan catatan anaknya, Naali dan Amin. Naskah itu sendiri, menurut dia, dikenal dengan nama Tambo Naali Sulthan Chaniago.

Transliterasi dilakukan Sjafnir ke dalam bahasa Minang-Melayu, membuat naskah ini agak sulit dipahami dalam waktu singkat. "Saya butuh waktu lama untuk memahami naskah ini," kata peneliti sejarah Tapanuli Selatan, Basyral Hamidy Harahap.

Tak ada bagian dari naskah ini yang menampilkan sikap Imam Bonjol akan kekerasan yang dilakukan Padri. "Tapi saya yakin Imam Bonjol mengetahui kekejaman kaum Padri, baik penculikan maupun pemerkosaan. Tapi ia diam saja," kata Basyral.

Ia merujuk, ada halaman yang menampilkan masalah penculikan dan jual-beli perempuan ternyata dibicarakan secara terbuka dalam suatu pertemuan yang dihadiri tokoh-tokoh umat, yakni Sultan Chaniago, Nan Pahit, Datuk Kayo, Datuk Limo Koto, Rajo Minang, Punjuak Batuah, dan Pado Alim.

"Pailah (pergilah—Red.) ke rumah Malin Kecil, basua (bertemu) perempuan. Ditanyalah dek (oleh) Datuk Limo Koto perempuan itu. 'Siapo nan manangkap di lading Batang Silasung?' kata Datuk Limo Koto. Alah (kemudian) menjawab perempuan, 'Nan manangkap saya dicari (si Cari) orang Durian Tinggi. Dijualnya dek si Cari itu saya kepada Rajo Manang. Dek Rajo Manang dijual pula ke Bamban.'"

Sejarawan dari Universitas Andalas, Padang, Dr Gusti Asnan, melihat, untuk sebuah catatan harian, Tuanku Imam Bonjol sangat tidak mungkin menuliskan fakta-fakta kebrutalan Padri. "Bila dibandingkan dengan sumber sejarah Belanda, Tuanku Imam Bonjol tidak memasukkan peristiwa pembakaran, perampokan, serta penculikan dan pemerkosaan perempuan. Tapi saya pikir dia tahu mengenai kejadian itu," ungkap Gusti.

Baik Basyral maupun Gusti melihat proses negosiasi Tuanku yang diwakili anaknya, Sutan Chaniago, dengan pemimpin Belanda sama sekali tidak menunjukkan ketegangan. Mengherankan, Imam Bonjol yang dikenal sebagai sosok penentang Belanda yang gigih kemudian seperti melemah. Bahkan Gusti melihat keakraban Tuanku dengan Residen Elout dan Residen Francis aneh.

"Sekarang Tuanku pergi ke negri Menado, karena negri Menado baik, tempat baik, makanan murah…."

"Sebagai seorang pahlawan nasional, apa iya Tuanku tidak merasa curiga terhadap niat Belanda?" tanya Gusti.

Sita Planasari Aquadini, Seno Joko Suyono

Kontroversi Kebrutalan Kaum Padri

Iqra

Tempo - Edisi. 34/XXXVI/15 - 21 Oktober 2007

Gerakan Padri selama ini diidentikkan dengan kepahlawanan Imam Bonjol dan kelom­pok­nya melawan Belanda. Tapi belakangan se­buah buku lama yang kontroversial dan me­nunjukkan sisi gelap Padri, Tuanku Rao, diterbitkan kembali. Lalu muncul buku baru dengan judul Greget Tuanku Rao sebagai reaksi.

Kedua buku ini memperlihatkan bahwa gerakan Padri sesungguhnya adalah gerakan Wahabi—gerakan pemurnian Islam yang dilakukan secara keras terhadap Islam kultural di Minang dan Batak. Dan itulah gerakan yang membuat puluhan ribu nyawa jadi korban. Imam Bonjol dianggap dengan sadar melakukan itu, sehingga ada usul gelar pahlawan nasional dicabut darinya. Be­tulkah demikian? Ikuti pembahasan Tempo.

… Petisi ini mendesak Pemerintah Indonesia untuk membatalkan pengangkatan Tuanku Imam Bonjol sebagai Pahlawan Perjuangan Kemerdekaan…. Imam Bonjol adalah pimpinan Gerakan Wahabi Paderi…. Gerakan ini memiliki aliran yang sama dengan Taliban dan Al Qaeda…. Invasi Paderi ke Tanah Batak menewaskan jutaan orang….

Petisi online itu tersebar di banyak mailing list seminggu lalu. Seorang anak muda, Mudy Situmorang—lulusan Teknik Elektro Institut Teknologi Sepuluh Nopember, kelahiran Simanindo, Pulau Samosir—telah mengirimnya. Dalam petisi itu, ia membeberkan dosa-dosa gerakan Padri, antara lain pembantaian massal keluarga Kerajaan Minangkabau Pagaruyung dan penyerbuan Padri ke Batak yang menewaskan Sisingamangaraja X.

Ia mengatakan petisi itu atas nama pribadi, bukan organisasi, dan semata-semata untuk pelurusan sejarah. "Kita tunggu sampai 500 pendukung. Hasilnya dikirim ke pemerintah," katanya saat dihubungi Tempo. Sampai sekarang, petisi itu memang belum "berbunyi".

Namun petisi ini mengingatkan orang akan dua buah buku bertema sama yang baru-baru ini terbit. Yang satu adalah buku lama karya Mangaradja Onggang Parlindungan berjudul Tuanku Rao. Buku itu pertama kali dicetak penerbit Tanjung Pengharapan, 1964, dan diluncurkan kembali oleh penerbit LKiS Yogya, Juni lalu, tanpa suntingan apa pun, bahkan tetap dalam ejaan lama.

Itulah buku yang pada 1964 menghebohkan. Buku itu tidak bercerita langsung tentang Imam Bonjol, tapi berisi kronologi penyerangan komandan-komandan Padri. Parlindungan sendiri menyusun buku itu berdasarkan data sejarah Batak yang dimiliki ayahnya, Sutan Martua Radja. Pada 1918, ayahnya adalah guru sejarah di Normaalschool Pematangsiantar. Ayahnya memiliki warisan dokumen sejarah Batak turun-temurun dari tiga generasi sepanjang 1851-1955.

Di samping itu, Parlindungan memakai bahan-bahan milik Residen Poortman. Posisi Poortman sama dengan Snouck Hurgronje. Snouck adalah seorang ahli Aceh, yang informasinya diminta oleh pemerintah Belanda. Sedangkan Poortman adalah seorang ahli Batak. Poortman pensiun pada 1930 dan kembali ke Belanda. Di Leiden, Belanda, Poortman lalu menemukan laporan-laporan para perwira Padri sepanjang 1816-1820 untuk Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Parlindungan mengenal Poortman secara pribadi dan pernah bertemu di Belanda. Poortman mengirimkan bahan-bahan laporan itu saat Parlindungan menulis bukunya.

Parlindungan bukan sejarawan profesional. Caranya menulis pun serampangan. Data yang diramunya itu sering ditampilkan cut and glue atau dinarasikan kembali dengan bahasa campuran: bahasa Indonesia lisan, kadang disisipi kalimat-kalimat Inggris yang panjang. Di sana-sini, ia memberikan komentar yang cara penulisannya seperti seorang ayah yang menerangkan kisah kepada anaknya. Kata ganti yang dipakai untuk dirinya adalah "Daddy". Sedangkan anak laki-lakinya di situ disebut "Sonny Boy". Ketika polemik menghangat, buku itu ditarik dari peredaran. Buku itu pun jadi buku langka. Di sebuah pameran buku di Jakarta, buku itu beberapa tahun lalu bahkan sempat dihargai Rp 1,5 juta.

Buku kedua, Greget Tuanku Rao, ditulis Basyral Hamidy Harahap, terbit September lalu. Basyral adalah Ketua Jurusan Perpustakaan Universitas Indonesia 1965-1967 dan pensiunan pustakawan Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV). Ia ingin mengoreksi beberapa info tentang Tuanku Rao yang dianggapnya kurang tepat. Tapi, pada garis besarnya, ia sepakat dan bahkan menambahkan data kekerasan yang dilakukan Padri. "Buku Parlindungan banyak salahnya, tapi buku itu ada di jalan yang benar."

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Siapakah Parlindungan? Tak banyak yang tahu sosok pengarang ini. Basyral sendiri pada 1974 pernah bertemu dengannya di dekat rumah Hamka di Jakarta. Ia langsung menanyakan kabar polemik antara Parlindungan dan Buya Hamka. Agaknya Parlindungan tak suka. "Saat itu ia langsung mengarahkan tongkatnya yang berkepala gading ke arah dahi saya. Saya kaget, mengelak," kenang Basyral.

Hal ini sedikit terkuak ketika anaknya, Dorpi Parlindungan Siregar, kini 59 tahun, mau bercerita kepada Tempo—dialah anak yang dipanggil Sonny Boy dalam bukunya.

"Ayah saya seorang perwira KNIL. Perjalanan karier ayah saya dimulai ketika pada 1 Oktober 1945, Jenderal Mayor Oerip Soemohardjo mendirikan Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR). Beliau mengumpulkan 17 anak muda di Yogyakarta, di antaranya Soeharto, Ibnu Sutowo, dan ayah saya."

Pada usia 27 tahun, menurut Dorpi, ayahnya memperoleh pangkat letnan kolonel. Sebagai insinyur kimia lulusan Jerman dan Belanda, ayahnya menjadi bawahan dr Willer Hutagalung, dulu dokter pribadi Jenderal Soedirman. Mereka kemudian mengambil bekas pabrik mesiu dan peralatan senjata Belanda, yang lalu menjadi Pindad.

Pada 1960, ayahnya ditahan rezim Soekarno karena dianggap pro-Masyumi. Tempat tahanan ayahnya berpindah-pindah, dan akhirnya menjalani tahanan rumah. Di sanalah, dengan data milik kakeknya dan Residen Poortman, ayahnya menulis buku Tuanku Rao.

Dan yang mengejutkan, bagian terbesar halaman buku ayahnya menceritakan kisah kejahatan algojo Padri bernama Tuanku Lelo, sosok yang tak lain menurut Parlindungan adalah kakek dari kakeknya sendiri. "Jadi ia seperti menceritakan aib keluarga sendiri. Tak banyak penulis yang berani seperti itu," kata Ahmad Fikri dari LKiS. Buku itu awalnya, menurut Dorpi, tidak diperuntukkan bagi umum, tapi bagi anak-anaknya saja. "Sehabis membaca Al-Quran setiap hari, Ayah membacakan cerita ini untuk saya dan adik," kenang Dorpi akan ayahnya yang meninggal pada 1975 itu. Atas desakan teman-temannya, buku itu akhirnya diterbitkan.

Buku itu intinya berisi informasi bagaimana gerakan Wahabi masuk Minang. Waktu itu, tahun 1803, Haji Piobang, Haji Sumanik, dan Haji Miskin kembali ke Minang setelah bermukim di Mekkah lebih dari 12 tahun. Mereka adalah bekas perwira tentara Turki. Mereka mencoba menanamkan mazhab Hambali di Sumatera, menekankan pemurnian Islam.

Gerakan pembersihan agama Islam ini menarik hati seorang mubalig besar bernama Tuanku Nan Rentjeh, yang tengah gundah lantaran di Minang berkembang Islam Syiah. Mereka bersama-sama kemudian mencita-citakan suatu Darul Islam. Piobang membentuk pasukan Padri yang sangat profesional. Pakaian mereka serba putih. Persenjataannya cukup kuat. Mereka, misalnya, menurut Parlindungan, memiliki meriam 88 milimeter bekas milik tentara Napoleon yang dibeli "second hand" di Penang. Dua belas perwira Padri dikirim belajar di Turki. Tuanku Rao, yang aslinya seorang Batak bernama Pongkinangolngolan Sinambela, dikirim untuk belajar taktik kavaleri; Tuanku Tambusai, aslinya bernama Hamonangan Harahap, belajar soal perbentengan. Pasukan Padri juga memiliki pendidikan kemiliteran di Batusangkar.

Sasaran pertama "gerakan kaum putih" ini adalah Istana Pagaruyung, karena istana itu dianggap sebagai boneka Belanda yang merintangi Darul Islam. Pada 1804, ribuan rumah dibakar dan keluarga Istana Pagaruyung dibantai. Untuk cita-cita Darul Islam, pasukan Padri ingin meluaskan agresinya ke luar alam Minangkabau—ke tanah Batak.

Salah satu tamatan pendidikan militer Batusangkar, bernama Peto Syarif Ibnu Pandito Bayanuddin, oleh Tuanku Nan Rentjeh diperintah mencari lokasi yang bakal digunakan sebagai benteng—basis tentara Padri menyerang Tanah Batak. Peto menemukan bekas sarang perampok di rute Minangkabau-Batak bernama Bonjol. Ia mengislamkan kawasan Bonjol, membangun benteng di sana, serta melatih kekuatan 10 ribu tentara. Sejak itu, ia dijuluki Imam Bonjol.

Buku Tuanku Rao ini menjelaskan cukup detail bagaimana persiapan dan kronologi invasi Padri ke Batak Selatan (1816) dan Toba (1818- 1820). Dari etape-etape dan serangan kilat (blitzkrieg), siasat-siasat, sampai notula rapat-rapat para panglima dideskripsikan. Pendiri Padri, Haji Piobang dan Tuanku Imam Bonjol, mengkoordinasi penyebaran pasukan di bawah pimpinan Tuanku Rao, Tuanku Tambusai, Tuanku Lelo, Tuanku Asahan, Tuanku Maga, dan Tuanku Kotapinang.

Toba dikepung dari empat penjuru. Tuanku Asahan dengan kavaleri berkekuatan 11 ribu tentara menyerang dari samping kanan; Kolonel Djagorga Harahap dengan kekuatan 4.000 anggota pasukan dari sayap kiri; Tuanku Maga menusuk dari sisi tengah atas dengan 5.000 anggota pasukan; Tuanku Lelo bersama 9.000 tentaranya merangsek dari sisi tengah bawah. Pada 1820, Sisingamangaraja X, yang bertahan di Benteng Bakkara, akhirnya tewas. Kepala Sisingamangaraja X ditusuk di atas tombak, dipancang di tanah.

Penyerbuan yang paling bengis dilakukan oleh Tuanku Lelo. Parlindungan sendiri menganggap "eyangnya" itu "kriminal perang". Tuanku Lelo bernama asli Idris Nasution. Sosoknya besar, berjanggut hitam, berambut panjang, berombak-ombak. Ia mengenakan baju jubah dan serban yang seluruhnya putih serta suka memakai selempang dan ikat pinggang berwarna merah bertaburan emas—yang dirampasnya di Pagaruyung. Ia dikenal sebagai algojo pembantai, juga maniak seks.

Parlindungan bahkan sampai menyebut eyangnya itu seorang big scoundrel yang memiliki kelakuan binatang. Di tiap kawasan, sang eyang mengumpulkan ratusan wanita, lalu memerkosanya. Di Toba, 14 malam berturut-berturut pasukannya dibiarkan melakukan pesta seks besar-besaran.

Ketika pasukan bergerak meninggalkan Toba, Tuanku Lelo memerintahkan ribuan wanita dikumpulkan di Red Light District di Sigumpar Toba. Dari Sigumpar, mereka digiring berjalan kaki melalui Siborong-borong, Pangaribuan, Silantom, Simangambat, Sipirok, menuju Natal Mandailing. Sesampai di Mandailing, hanya 300 wanita selamat; 900 mati. Yang capek dipenggal.

Kemudian Belanda memutuskan menyerang Padri. Pertempuran pada 1820, menurut Parlindungan, meletus di Benteng Air Bengis. Imam Bonjol turun sendiri. Tuanku Rao tewas di situ. Nah, di pertempuran Air Bengis ini, secara licik Tuanku Lelo melakukan desersi. Melihat Imam Bonjol terdesak, ia lalu memimpin kavalerinya sendiri menuju Angkola dan Sipirok. Ia melanjutkan petualangannya, menjarah, membunuh, melampiaskan nafsu seksualnya. Ia lalu menjadi warlord di Angkola dan Sipirok selama 1822-1833. Ia di sana mendirikan sebuah harem di bentengnya di Padang Sidempuan.

Buku Tuanku Rao hanya sedikit menyinggung peran Tuanku Tambusai. Namun, menurut Basyral, Tuanku Tambusai tak kalah kejam dibanding Tuanku Lelo. "Kebrutalan Tuanku Tambusai terjadi di daerah Padang Lawas, Dolok, dan Barumun. Salah satu kawasan yang paling parah terkena adalah daerah nenek moyang saya, Simanabun," tutur Basyral (lihat "Tambusai dan Pasukan Putih-putih").

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Para sejarawan berbeda pendapat soal kebrutalan ini. "Sebetulnya masuknya Padri ke Batak bukan ekspansi. Kelompok-kelompok musuh Padri saat itu dapat dipukul mundur hingga ke Tapanuli Selatan. Karena itu, mereka bertempur sampai ke daerah tersebut," tutur Dr Mestika Zed, sejarawan dari Universitas Negeri Padang.

"Sebagai sebuah buku sejarah, buku Parlindungan sumbernya sangat lemah. Dokumen Poortman sendiri diragukan. Banyak yang tidak faktual," kata Dr Asvi Warman Adam dari Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia. Hamka bahkan pernah menganggap Tuanku Lelo hanyalah karangan Parlindungan belaka (lihat "Mengenang Sanggahan Hamka"). Memang, sekarang mustahil untuk mengecek semua sumber yang digunakan Parlindungan, karena semua data itu dimusnahkan oleh Parlindungan sendiri.

Dalam bukunya itu, Parlindungan menyebutkan data yang diwariskan ayahnya kepadanya hanya meliputi 20 persen dari yang dimiliki ayahnya. Ia menyaksikan sendiri, pada 1941, ayahnya membakar sisanya sambil bercucuran air mata di tepi Sungai Bah Bolon.

"Daddy tidak mau risiko," katanya kepada anaknya. "Our family secrets yang ketahuan pada outsiders cukup yang terbatas dalam buku ini. No more." "Saya menduga, itu adalah alibi dia, yang sebenarnya tak cukup memiliki data otentik, atau bisa juga ia tak mau sejarawan lain menelitinya," kata J.J. Rizal dari Yayasan Bambu, yang menerbitkan Greget Tuanku Rao.

Akan halnya Dr Gusti Asnan, pengajar Jurusan Sejarah Fakultas Sastra Universitas Andalas, Padang, menganggap tidak semua sumber Belanda yang digunakan Parlindungan mengandung bias. Dari 100 laporan, ada 20-50 persen data yang benar. Menurut dia, historiografi Perang Padri sendiri dimulai pada 1950-an. "Saat itu terjadi dekolonialisasi historiografi Indonesia, termasuk Perang Padri. Demi persatuan dan kesatuan, bagian-bagian miring dari data yang ada, seperti kebrutalan Perang Padri, sengaja tidak disiarkan."

Ia juga melihat gerakan pasukan Padri tak semata-mata bermotif agama, tapi juga ekonomi. Sejak akhir abad ke-18 hingga awal abad ke-19, perkembangan ekonomi di Sumatera Barat memang luar biasa karena booming kopi.

Dr Gusti pernah membaca sebuah kisah tentang saudagar bernama Peto Magik di Pasaman. Ia dikenal sebagai saudagar Padri—bisa dianggap konglomerat. Seorang Belanda bernama Bulhawer yang melakukan kerja sama dengan Peto mengaku tidak melihat sedikit pun gambaran islami padanya. "Kesan yang dilihat Bulhawer, Peto Magik adalah seorang kapitalis. Dan gambaran ini saya rasa juga menggambarkan sebagian besar kaum Padri," ujar Gusti.

Maka, menurut Gusti, ketika daerah kekuasaan di Tanah Datar dan Agam mulai direbut Belanda, kaum Padri pun meluaskan ekspansi ke utara: Bonjol, Pasaman, dan Tapanuli Selatan. Mengapa ke utara? Karena daerah utara memiliki basis kekayaan yang sangat tinggi. Apalagi, dengan menguasai area tersebut, Padri masih dapat melakukan hubungan dengan kaum lain, seperti Aceh, melalui jalur sungai.

Sekalipun mengakui kekerasan yang dilakukan Padri, sebagian orang memandang dari sudut berbeda. "Soalnya saat itu kan tidak ada HAM," kata sejarawan Taufik Abdullah.

Basyral sendiri melihat Imam Bonjol mengetahui segala perampokan, pemerkosaan, dan mutilasi yang dilakukan perwira-perwiranya. "Mustahil Imam Bonjol tak tahu. Ia kan komandan," kata Basyral.

Tapi Taufik Abdullah tak sependapat. Menurut dia, kekerasan di awal gerakan Padri bukan tanggung jawab Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Saat gerakan Padri masih radikal di awal, Tuanku Imam Bonjol masih muda dan baru menjabat sebagai asisten Tuanku Bandaro, salah satu pemimpin gerakan Padri saat itu.

"Buat saya, pencabutan gelar pahlawan itu nonsens. Justru di bawah pimpinan Tuanku Imam Bonjol pasukan Padri lebih menitikberatkan serangan pada pihak Belanda," kata Taufik.

Menurut Taufik, keliru jika melihat sosok Imam Bonjol dalam Padri disamakan dengan Diponegoro. "Diponegoro merupakan pemimpin tunggal, sementara gerakan Padri merupakan gerakan sosial kolektif, dengan banyak pemimpin," katanya.

Taufik mengatakan, bahkan, Tuanku Imam Bonjol sempat mengirim empat anak buahnya ke Mekkah untuk naik haji, termasuk Tuanku Tambusai. Tujuannya untuk melihat kondisi Islam di Mekkah. Ternyata Islam saat itu jauh lebih moderat. Sehingga, ketika kembali ke Minang, Tuanku Tambusai pun menjadi lebih moderat. Sekembali dari Mekkah, seperti disebut dalam Tuanku Rao, ia pun menyesal melihat dengan mata kepala sendiri bagaimana wanita-wanita ditawan oleh pasukan Tuanku Lelo.

Menurut Taufik, adat basandi syarak justru mengemuka di bawah kepemimpinan Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Imam Bonjol wafat pada usia 93 tahun di Manado, pada 1864. Tak banyak orang yang tahu, ia meninggalkan sebuah "catatan harian" (lihat "Dari Catatan Harian Bonjol").

Seno Joko Suyono, Sita Planasari

Dua Jilid Terra Incognita

Tempo - Edisi. 34/XXXVI/15 - 21 Oktober 2007

Dua buku ekologi Papua diterbitkan, menggenapi lima seri alam Indonesia. Hanya menyingkap sebagian kekayaan Papua.

The Ecology of Papua
Editor: Andrew J. Marshall, Bruce M. Beehler
Penerbit: Periplus International, 2007 Tebal: 1.476 halaman (2 volume)

Sampai pertengahan abad lalu, para ilmuwan hayati dunia meyakini Papua sebagai satu-satunya terra incognita—dunia tak dikenal—yang terbesar dan masih tersisa. Bahkan, menurut G.S. Hope, peneliti dari Australia, sampai pertengahan 1976, hanya segelintir peneliti yang dengan izin khusus bisa memasuki kawasan ini.

Papua yang dekat, tapi begitu jauh dari jangkauan, merupakan persoalan kontemporer kita. Dan keadaan miris ini berlangsung hingga akhir September lalu—ketika dua volume Ecology of Papua, tebalnya mencapai 1.476 halaman, diterbitkan. Sebuah buku yang mencoba mencatat keadaan geografis serta kekayaan hewani dan nabati subkontinen yang menakjubkan itu. Patut pula dicatat, semua ini jadi lebih terbuka setelah 86 orang pakar hayati dan taksonomi bergerak sepuluh tahun silam, seraya mengumpulkan keanekaragaman hayati tanah Papua.

Ya, Ecology of Papua adalah hasil jerih payah yang panjang yang membuahkan hasil. Lihatlah bagaimana buku ini menggambarkan bahwa sebuah pohon roboh bisa dihuni oleh 173 jenis lumut. Tapi gambaran Papua yang tertangkap dalam buku ini tentu saja lebih dari itu. Ecology of Papua menyampaikan bahwa para pakar itu menjumpai 20-25 ribu spesies tanaman berpembuluh, dan sekitar 60-90 persen merupakan endemik Papua. Ada catatan istimewa tentang paku-pakuan yang meliputi sekitar 2.000 spesies; 30 persen di antaranya berada di atas ketinggian 4.000 meter dari permukaan laut.

Dari dunia nabati, kita juga bisa mendapatkan gambaran kekayaan anggrek Papua—plus Papua Nugini. Mereka menyimpan sekitar 2.800 spesies anggrek atau sekitar 11 persen dari anggrek dunia. Dengan kata lain, merekalah yang terkaya kedua, setelah Pegunungan Andes di Amerika Selatan.

Di luar kekayaan nabati, Papua punya kekayaan lain. Di pulau itu, para pakar menemukan antara lain 37.643 spesies vertebrata atau sekitar 6,5 persen dari binatang bertulang belakang di dunia. Di antaranya terdapat 600 spesies burung, termasuk 25 spesies cenderawasih. Mereka memperkirakan Papua memiliki 300-500 ribu spesies vertebrata. Serangga saja jumlahnya ditaksir 100 ribu spesies dan baru sebagian kecil yang dikatalogkan. Dengan jumlah flora dan fauna yang melimpah itu pun, menurut Direktur Pusat Penelitian Biologi Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Dedy Darnaedi, "Mungkin baru sebagian kecil kekayaan hayati Papua yang bisa diungkap."

Hewan Papua juga merupakan campuran hewan Benua Asia dan Australia. Ada satu hal yang menarik dicatat dari buku ini: temuan mereka tentang kanguru pohon. Dan ini membuktikan bahwa spesies itu belum punah. Sebagaimana diketahui, kanguru pohon yang hanya hidup di Papua itu tidak pernah ditemukan selama 90 tahun terakhir. Dilengkapi ratusan foto, gambar, dan peta, Ecology of Papua tak pelak lagi bisa menjadi rujukan untuk hal-hal yang sangat praktis. Misalnya zonasi dalam pengelolaan sumber alam. Dan kita mungkin masih ingat rencana pembangunan proyek listrik tenaga air Mamberamo dua-tiga tahun lalu—rencana yang terpaksa terhenti lantaran lokasinya masih masuk zona inti yang tidak boleh disentuh oleh pemanfaatan manusia.

Apa pun, yang jelas, terbitnya buku ekologi Papua ini menambah khazanah literatur ekologi Indonesia, yakni melengkapi lima seri ekologi Indonesia yang sudah ada: ekologi Sumatera, Kalimantan, Jawa dan Bali, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara dan Maluku, serta satu seri ekologi laut Indonesia.

I G.G. Maha Adi

Just a Prude? Feminism, Pornography, and Men’s Responsibility

By Robert Jensen
Original URL

I want to begin by coming out: I am a man. More specifically, I am a white man. That’s important because it suggest two things regarding what I know about the world. First, I know some things that women don’t know about men. By definition, women are never in all-male spaces. Women don’t directly experience what men say about them when there are no women around. I do, and that means I know some things that women don’t.

Being a man also means there’s a lot I don’t know, that I have had to learn—and have to keep learning—from women and a feminist movement. In these remarks, I’m going to speak about the feminist critique of pornography and the feminist anti-pornography movement, from which I have learned much. But in doing that, I should acknowledge the irony of a man talking to a group of mostly women about the feminist analysis of pornography. I need to make it clear that I am not speaking for women. Instead, I see my role as speaking with women, and with the ultimate goal of speaking about the insights of this critique to men.

But even that is complicated, of course, because women do not speak with one voice about pornography, nor any other issue. There are pro-pornography women who would contest much of what I have to say. All I can do is acknowledge the women who have helped me come to understand the issue, tell the truth as I see it, and ask men to take seriously this critique of the domination/subordination dynamic that is so common in pornography and, indeed, in the world.

The minute one begins to make such a critique, one can expect this response: Feminists who critique pornography are really just prudes at heart. Pornography’s opponents, we are told, are afraid of sex. In one sense, that’s true. I am afraid of sex, of a certain kind. I’m afraid of much of the sex commonly presented in contemporary mass-marketed pornography. I am afraid of sex that is structured on a dynamic of domination and subordination. I am afraid of the sex in pornography that has become so routinely harsh that men typically cannot see the brutality of it thorough their erections and orgasms. I’m not against sex or sexual pleasure. I’m against the kind of sex that is routinely presented in contemporary pornography. I’m against that kind of sex because it hurts people in the world today, and it helps constructs a world in which people—primarily the most vulnerable people, women and children, both girls and boys—will continue to be hurt.

 

Pornographic sex

Let me describe one kind of sex that I’m afraid of. This is a scene from the film Gag Factor #10 released by J.M. Productions, which boasts that it pushes the envelope in pornography. The company website brags that this gag series, which is going on #17 as of March 2005, offers ‘The best throatfucking ever lensed.’ If you want a sample, the website has pictures and short video clips, under the heading ‘this week’s victim,’ with the promise ‘new whores degraded every Wednesday.’

In one of the 10 scenes from Gag Factor #10, released in 2002, a nagging wife is haranguing her husband and asking why he is so lazy. ‘Why can’t you do anything?’ she asks, going on to insult his intelligence and criticize him because he doesn’t read. She asks him if he even can read, and then suggests Henry Miller, from which she starts to read. The camera focuses on her mouth as she reads, then cuts to his eyes, which look increasingly angry. The film cuts to the woman on her knees as he yells, ‘Shut the fuck up.’ He grabs her hair and thrusts his penis into her mouth. From this point on, we hear almost exclusively from him: ‘Your teeth feel good you little bitch. Eat that dick. … Are you OK? Are you crying? I love you. I fucking love you. Open that mouth.’ He slaps her mouth with his penis. ‘Open wide. Choke. Open wider, wider. You’re so good baby. Put your mouth on my balls. You treat me so fucking good. That’s why I keep you here. Give me the eyes [meaning, look up at me] while I gag you. … Do you like to gag? Beg for it. Say please. Say please gag me some more. … Your throat is so good.’ At this point, she re-enters the conversation. She says, ‘Keep going.’ He says, ‘Good, that’s the fucking answer I was looking for.’ He then flips her over, putting her on the table with her head hanging over edge. She gags several times when he thrusts into her mouth. He holds her by the cheeks, spreading her face apart. She gags but he doesn’t stop. He allows her to catch her breath. Her face is unexpressive, almost frozen. ‘I want those tears to come out again, baby. I want to choke the shit out of you,’ he says. He grabs her hair and drives his penis into her mouth. He says: ‘Suck that dick. Convulse. I want to see your eyes roll back in your fucking head. Yes, I love it.’ He asks her if she loves it; she says yes. He ejaculates into her mouth and says, ‘Spit that cum out. I can’t hear you. What did you say? Don’t talk with your mouth full.’ He walks away and says ‘Don’t give me any more shit.’

Gag Factor is a type of ‘gonzo’ pornography, which is the roughest form available in the mainstream pornography shops and also the fastest growing genre. This scene is more overtly misogynistic than some, but it is not idiosyncratic. The sex and the language in what the industry calls ‘features’ typically is not as rough, though the message is the same: Women are for sex, and women like sex this way.

Empathy

I am afraid of the sex I just described to you. I’m worried about the physical and emotional well-being of the woman in that scene. I’m afraid of the way in which the men who use that pornography will act in their own lives, toward women in their lives. I am afraid of the world that such sex helps to create. I am afraid, and you should be, too.

If anyone wants to dismiss these concerns with the tired old phrases ‘to each his own’ and ‘as long as they are consenting adults’—that is, if you want to ignore the reality and complexity of the world in which we live—I can’t stop you. But I can tell you that if you do that, you are abandoning minimal standards of political and moral responsibility, and you become partially responsible for the injuries done as a result of a system you refuse to confront. I will defend that conclusion in a moment. But first, I want to make sure we come to terms with the scene I just described. We live in a world in which a woman can be aggressively ‘throat fucked’ to facilitate the masturbation of men. We all live in that world. We all live with that woman in Gag Factor #10. She is one of us. She is a person. She has hopes and dreams and desires of her own. We all live with that woman who finds herself making a living by being filmed in another kind of gonzo film called a Blow Bang, in which a woman has oral sex in similar fashion with more than one man.

In one of these films, Blow Bang #4, released in 2001, a young woman dressed as a cheerleader is surrounded by six men. For about seven minutes, ‘Dynamite’ (the name she gives on tape) methodically moves from man to man while they offer insults such as ‘you little cheerleading slut.’ For another minute and a half, she sits upside down on a couch, her head hanging over the edge, while men thrust into her mouth, causing her to gag. She strikes the pose of the bad girl to the end. ‘You like coming on my pretty little face, don’t you,’ she says, as they ejaculate on her face and in her mouth for the final two minutes of the scene. Five men have finished. The sixth steps up. As she waits for him to ejaculate onto her face, now covered with semen, she closes her eyes tightly and grimaces. For a moment, her face changes; it is difficult to read her emotions, but it appears she may cry. After the last man, number six, ejaculates, she regains her composure and smiles. Then the narrator off camera hands her the pom-pom she had been holding at the beginning of the tape and says, ‘Here’s your little cum mop, sweetheart—mop up.’ She buries her face in the pom-pom and the scene ends. Dynamite is one of us. She is a person. She has hopes and dreams and desires of her own.

The women in the movement to end men’s violence have helped society understand that we have to empathize with the victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. We also need to extend that empathy to the women in pornography and prostitution. Now we are going to practice empathy, that most fundamental of human qualities. I want us to think of that scene with Dynamite. One woman and six men. After she has performed oral sex on six men, after six men have thrust their penises into her throat to the point of gagging, after six men have ejaculated onto her, the camera is turned off. Think not about the sex acts but about the moment when the camera shuts off. The men walk away. Someone throws her a towel. She has to clean the semen of six strangers off her face and body and from her hair. This woman, who is a person, who is one of us, who has hopes and dreams and desires of her own, cleans herself off.

Now, I want you to imagine that the woman in that scene is your child. I want you to think about how you would feel if the woman being handed a towel to wipe off the semen of six men were your child, someone you had raised and loved and cared for. How does that feel? Then imagine that woman is the child of your best friend, or of your neighbor, or of someone you work with. Then imagine that women is the child of someone you have never met and never will meet. Imagine that woman is just a person, one of us, with hopes and dreams and desires of her own. Forget about whether or not she is your child. She is a person; she is one of us. Imagine that you are the one handing her the towel. Look into her eyes. We need to dare to look into her eyes and try to understand what she might be feeling. You can’t know for sure what she is feeling. But try to imagine how you would feel if it were you.We are constantly told pornography is about fantasies. Those scenes I just described are not fantasy. They are real. They happened. They happened to those women. Those women are not a fantasy. They are people. They are just like us.

And after those scenes were put on videotape, the films were sold and rented to thousands of men who took it home, put it into VCRs or DVD players, and masturbated to orgasm. That also is real. Men fantasize when they masturbate, but the men who are masturbating are not a fantasy. Thousands of men have climaxed to the recording of those women being aggressively ‘throat fucked.’ Those orgasms happened in the real world. Those men’s sexual pleasure was being conditioned to images of women being aggressively ‘throat fucked,’ in the real world. Those specific women and those specific men are part of the world we live in. And that idea of what a woman is, and that idea of what’s men’s sexuality is—those ideas are also part of the world we live in. None of it is a fantasy. All of it is as real as we are.

So, I want to pose a simple question: What do we owe those women? What do we owe Dynamite? What is our responsibility to her, to her hopes and dreams and Choices, hers and ours?

At this point, some will think: ‘Whatever you or I may think of those activities, she chose to do that. She’s an adult. Who are we to condemn her choice?’ I agree; we shouldn’t condemn her choice, and we shouldn’t condemn her. We should empathize with her. And we should think not just about her choice abut about the choices of the men who pay for the tape and create the demand for aggressive ‘throat fucking.’ From research and the testimony of women who have been prostituted and used in pornography, we know that childhood sexual assault (which often leads victims to see their value in the world primarily as the ability to provide sexual pleasure for men) and economic hardship (a lack of meaningful employment choices at a livable wage) are key factors in many women’s decisions to enter the sex industry. We know how women in the sex industry—not all, but many—routinely dissociate to cope with what they do. We know that in one study of 130 street prostitutes, 68 percent met the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. We know that any meaningful discussion of choice can’t be restricted to the single moment when a woman decides to allow herself to be sold sexually, but must include all the background conditions that affect not only the objective choices she faces but her subjective assessment of those choices. What matters is not just what is available but how she perceives herself in relation to what is available. We know that in anyone’s life, completely free choices are rare, that every choice is made under some mix of constraint and opportunity.

I know, for instance, that in my large lecture classes when I give a multiple-choice exam, virtually none of the students believes that such exams are an accurate or meaningful way of measuring their learning. I know that many of them find such exams to be ridiculous, as do I. But all of my students ‘choose’ to take a test they know to be virtually useless (except for the data it provides me in a large cattle-call class so that I can assign grades at the end of the term). They choose to take that exam because if they chose not to—no matter how sensible and compelling their analysis of the exam’s flaws—they will not pass the course, and they will be denied something that is important to them, a college diploma. They could choose to reject the institution, and thereby give up that asset, but it would cost them. Their choice is free, but it is not made under conditions of complete freedom, given their limited power in the system. So, let us not be naïve about choice.

But, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that the specific woman who was used in that aggressive ‘throat fucking’ movie made a completely free and meaningful choice to participate, with absolutely no constraints on her. That could be the case, but it does not change the fact that many women in the industry choose under dramatic limitations. And so long as the industry is profitable and a large number of women are needed to make such films, it is certain that some number of those women will be choosing under conditions that render the concept of ‘free choice’ virtually meaningless. When a man buys or rents a videotape or DVD, he is creating the demand for pornography that will lead to some number of women being hurt, psychologically and/or physically. That is a fact in the world in which we live. So, men’s choices to buy or rent pornography are complicated by two realities. First, at any given moment, the consumer has no reliable way to judge which women are participating in the industry as a result of a meaningfully free choice. And second, even if the men consuming pornography could make such a determination about specific women in specific films, the demand for pornography that their purchase creates ensures that some women will be hurt. Given that conclusion, there is only one decision that men who claim to have even minimal standards of moral and political responsibility can make: They must not buy or rent pornography. Let me restate that in a personal way: You and I must not buy or rent pornography. You and I must not create the demand that creates the industry that creates a world in which vulnerable people will be hurt.

If we buy or rent pornography, we bear some responsibility for that world. We can try to pretend we don’t know that, but we can’t avoid that responsibility.

Justice and self-interest

That’s the argument from justice. It’s an argument that men, and the women who buy or rent pornography, should take seriously unless they want to abandon minimal moral and political standards. But it is fairly obvious that arguments from justice do not always move people who are in positions of power and privilege. Maybe such arguments from justice should be enough to change people, but they often aren’t. So, arguments from self-interest are important, too.

Men should stop buying and renting pornography because it is the right thing to do. They also should do it because it is in their self-interest. To explain that, I want to tell a story from my experience at the 2005 convention of the pornography industry, the AVN Adult Entertainment Expo, which I attended as part of a team working on a documentary film called Fantasies’ Matter. At the end of our first day filming at the convention, the film’s director/editor, Miguel Picker, and I walked out of the Sands Expo Center in Las Vegas without saying much. We had just spent the better part of the day together on the exhibition floor, which featured about 300 booths visited by thousands of people. Miguel had been behind the camera, and I had been interviewing pornography performers, producers, and fans about why they make, distribute, and consume sexually explicit media.

We had spent the day surrounded by images of women being presented and penetrated for the sexual pleasure of men. All around were pictures and posters, screens running endless porn loops, and display tables of dildos and sex dolls. I had listened to young men tell me that pornography had taught them a lot about what women really want sexually. I had listened to a pornography producer tell me that he thinks anal sex is popular in pornography because men like to think about fucking their wives and girlfriends in the ass to pay them back for being bitchy. And I interviewed the producer who takes great pride that his Gag Factor series was the first to feature exclusively aggressive ‘throat fucking.’ Miguel and I had spent the day surrounded by sex for sale, immersed in the predictable consequence of the collision of capitalism and patriarchy. We had talked to dozens of people for whom the process of buying and selling women for sex is routine. When that day was over, we walked silently from the convention center to the hotel. The first thing I said was, ‘I need a drink.’

I don’t want to feign naivete. As a child and young adult, I used pornography in fairly typical fashion. I have been working on the issue of pornography since 1988. I have talked to a lot of people about pornography, and in very short and controlled doses, I have watched enough of it to understand how corrosive it is to our individual and collective humanity. But I had never been to the industry convention before; I had always found a reason to avoid it. As Miguel and I left the hall, I understood why. ‘I need a drink,’ I said, and we stopped at the nearest hotel bar (which didn’t take long, given how many bars there are in a Las Vegas hotel). I sat down with a glass of wine. Miguel and I started to talk, searching for some way to articulate what we had just experienced, what we felt. But all I could do was cry.

It’s not that I had seen anything on the convention floor that I had never seen. It’s not that I had heard something significantly new or different from the people I had interviewed. It’s not that I had had some sort of epiphany about the meaning of pornography. It’s just that in that moment, the reality of the industry, of the products the industry produces, and the way in which they are used—it all came crashing down on me. My defenses were inadequate to combat a simple fact: The pornographers have won. In the short term, the efforts of the feminists who put forward the critique of pornography, the sex industry, and men’s violence have failed. The pornographers, for the time being, have won. The arguments from justice lost. The pornographers not only are thriving, but are more mainstream and normalized than ever. They can fill up a Las Vegas convention center, with the dominant culture paying no more notice than it would to the annual boat show.

And as the industry has become more normalized, paradoxically, the content of their films becomes ever crueler and more overtly degrading to women. The industry talk is dominated by talk of how to push it even further. Make it nastier. Make it, in the terms of one industry observer, ‘brutal and real.’ That’s the way the pornographers and the customers like it: Brutal. Because brutal is real. And real sells. It is real, and that’s at the heart of the sadness. What was reflected on the convention floor was not just a truth about pornography, but a truth about gender and sex and power in contemporary culture, as well as a truth about the brutality of capitalism. At the end of that day, I was more aware than ever that the feminist critique of pornography is not simply a critique of pornography but about the routine way we are trained to be sexual, about the eroticization of domination and subordination. Feminism, as I learned it, is a full-bore attack on systems of illegitimate authority, of which male dominance is one, along with white supremacy, capitalism, and imperialism.

And at that moment, all I could do was cry. It was a selfish indulgence, because at that moment, my tears were not for the women who are used and discarded by the industry, or the women who will be forced into sex they don’t want by the men in their lives who use pornography. The tears were not for girls and young women who bury their own needs and desires to become sexually what men want them to be. I wish I could honestly say that was front and center in my mind and heart at that moment. But the truth is that my tears at that moment were for myself. Those tears came because I realized, in a more visceral way than ever, that the pornographers have won and they are helping to construct a world that is not only dangerous for women and children, but also one in which I have fewer and fewer places to turn as a man. Fewer places to walk and talk and breathe that haven’t been colonized and pornographized. As I sat that, all I could say to Miguel was, ‘I don’t want live in this world.’ I think at that moment Miguel didn’t quite no what to make of my reaction. He was nice to me, but he must have thought I was going a bit over the top. I don’t blame him; I was a bit over the top. After all, we were there to make a documentary film about the industry, not live out a melodrama about my angst in a Las Vegas hotel bar.

The next day Miguel and I hit the convention floor again. At the end of that day, as we walked away, I made the same request. We sat at the same bar. I had another glass of wine and cried again. Miguel, I think, was glad it was the last day. So was I.

Two days after we left Las Vegas, Miguel called me from New York. This time he was crying. He told me that he had just come to his editing and recording studio and had put on some music. Miguel is not only a director and editor, but a very talented musician. He’s one of those people who understand the world through music. He told me that he had put on music that he finds particularly beautiful, and then the floodgates opened. ‘I understand what you meant in the bar,’ he said, speaking through his own tears.

I tell that story not to glorify two sensitive new-age men. Miguel actually is a sensitive person, though not very new-age. I’m not new-age, and I don’t feel particularly sensitive these days. I feel harsh and mean. I feel angry most of the time. I spend most of my days on political organizing. I don’t write poetry. I’m from North Dakota. People from North Dakota don’t write a lot of poetry. We shovel snow. I tell that story because it’s never been clearer to me that in the struggle over pornography, the sex industry, and men’s violence, it is not enough to be right and to make arguments solely about justice. The central insights of the feminist critique of pornography are, I believe, right. I think it is the most compelling way to understand the issue. If anything, that critique of pornography is truer today than it was when the founding mothers of the movement first articulated it in the late 1970s. But we live in a society in which the pornographers have won, in the short term. Their products are more widely accepted and available than ever. Much of the culture has bought the ‘pornography is liberation’ and ‘pornography is freedom’ lines. To the degree that an anti-pornography position can get traction in the dominant culture, it comes from right-wing groups that have co-opted the language of feminism—the political language of harm—as a cover for a regressive moralism that rejects the values of feminism. Those same right-wing groups typically resist a critique of the capitalist commodification of everything, an analysis crucial to understanding pornography.

At this moment, being right is not enough. We have to find ways to tap into the humanity of people, a humanity that is systematically diminished and obscured by capitalism and patriarchy, as well as the explicit racism in pornography. That’s the argument from self-interest that men must hear. Men get something very concrete from pornography: They get orgasms. For most men, it’s an extremely effective way to gain physical pleasure. But it comes at a cost, and the cost is our own humanity. To be a man in this sense is to surrender some part of your humanity. I speak from experience here: It’s a bad trade-off. No orgasm is worth that much. That’s why the experience that Miguel and I had on the floor is important. On that day, the concentrated inhumanity of the pornographic world overwhelmed us. I went onto the convention floor knowing a lot about pornography. I left the floor feeling it more deeply than ever before. We know a lot about the pornography industry and its effects. We know there is a compelling critique. We have to be willing to feel it, as well.

Feeling and thinking our way forward, together

I realize that this task is difficult: We have to help men understand the depravity of their own pleasure. We have to make them feel that sense of desperation, articulating it in a way that leads people to action not paralysis, hope not despair, resistance not capitulation. We have to make them face what pornography does to us all, men and women. For men, we have to make them face that to be a pornography user is to be a john, to be someone who is willing to buy women for sex, someone who sees sex as a commodity, someone who has traded his own humanity for an orgasm.

Those realities are not easy for women to face either. I can’t speak for women, of course, but I assume that it is not easy to be a woman and understand how pornography portrays women and their sexuality, and to know that men like it. Put bluntly, in pornography, women are reduced to three holes and two hands. In pornography, women are reduced to the parts of their bodies that can sexually stimulate men. Women are not really sex-objects (which at least implies they are human) but more fuck-objects, simply things to be penetrated. I imagine that is not an easy thing to face when you are faced with pornography all around you. I imagine it is not easy to realize that this is the world in which women learned to be sexual.

Men have some difficult realities to face. So do women. I understand how painful those realities can be, because I have struggled, and continue to struggle, with them, and I have talked to many other people about their struggles. Sometimes I feel like I know too much. Sometimes I wish that I didn’t have all these pictures in my head. Sometimes I wish I had never heard the stories of women’s pain that I have heard. But I never wish I were back where I was 20 years ago, because 20 years ago I also was in pain, albeit a very different kind. In some ways, that old pain was easier to mask, but it was impossible to escape. This newer pain might be more intense at times, but it is a necessary part of the process that has changed my life for the better. I don’t really like it, but I accept the need for it, because this pain can lead somewhere. It can lead to a long and difficult, but ultimately rewarding, process of trying to revision sexuality. It can lead to involvement in a political movement to change the world that, even if not successful in the short term, holds out the hope for not just personal but societal transformation. Confronting the violence and pain of the world, both outside and inside me, has led me to meet many amazing people whose friendship and love has sustained me through difficult times.

When we talk like this, one of the predictable rejoinders is that we are trying to impose strict sexual rules on others. As one prominent pro-pornography feminist scholar, Linda Williams, put it in a recent interview, ‘Really, who are anti-pornography activists to tell us where our sexual imaginations should go?’ I agree. No one can tell others where their sexual imaginations should go. Imaginations are unruly and notoriously resistant to attempts at control. But our imaginations come from somewhere. Our imaginations may be internal in some ways, but they are influenced by external forces. Can we not have a conversation about those influences? Are we so fragile that our sexual imaginations can’t stand up to honest human conversation? It seems that pro-pornography forces live with their own fear of sex, the fear of being accountable for their imaginations and actions. The defenses of pornography typically revert to the most superficial kind of liberal individualism that shuts off people from others, ignores the predictable harms of a profit-seeking industry that has little concern for people, and ignores the way in which we all collectively construct the culture in which we live. I have no interest in telling people where there sexual imaginations must end up. But I would like to be part of a conversation about the direction in which we think our sexual imaginations can move.

So, I am afraid of the sex that pornography creates because it hurts people. But I am not afraid of talking about an alternative to the cruelty and brutality of the pornography industry. I need that conversation. I can’t do this on my own. I’m not smart enough and I’m not strong enough. I need help. I know the direction I want to move, but I stumble on the way. I have made mistakes that have hurt others and hurt myself. I can correct some of those mistakes on my own, but none of us can do this completely on our own. So, can we start talking about how to move our sexual imaginations toward respect, toward empathy, toward connections based on equality not domination? Can we give up enough of our fear of the unknown to try to imagine together what that might look like?

This culture tends to talk about sex in terms of heat: Who’s hot, what kind of sex is hot. What if we shifted to a language of light? Sex not as something that produces heat, but something that shines light. Can we talk about moving toward the light? The light that is inside me and inside you. The same light that is inside Dynamite. I want to live in a world in which Dynamite can tell us her name, not the pornographers’ name. I want to live in a world in which we hear her about her hopes and dreams and desires, not the pornographers’. I want to live in that world not just for her sake but for my own, because it is that world in which I can find my own authentic hopes and dreams and desires.

We have given the pornographers far too much power to construct our sexual imaginations. It is our world, not theirs. It is our world to take back. This is not just about taking back the night, but taking back the whole day, taking back the culture’s imagination, taking back the way we see men and women and sex. If we do not, I fear that the light inside us will dim. Our hopes and dreams will be increasingly shaped by the pornographers. And our hopes for a desire based on equality, maybe even the dream of equality, may not survive. I am afraid of that.

We all need to work to make sure that does not happen. For Dynamite’s sake. For your own. For all of us.
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Robert Jensen is a journalism professor at the University of Texas at Austin, a founding member of the Robert Nowar Collective, and a member of the board of the Third Coast Activist Resource Center. He is the co-author of Pornography: The Production and Consumption of Inequality (Routledge) and author of Citizens of the Empire: The Struggle to Claim Our Humanity (City Lights Books). He can be reached at rjensen@uts.cc.utexas.edu.