28 December 2007

The 2007 books we liked best: fiction

The Christian Science Monitor the December 04, 2007 edition

 

Paula Spencer,by Roddy Doyle (Viking, 279 pp., $24.95)

In this warm and wryly humorous sequel to "The Woman Who Walked Into Doors," Man Booker Prize-winner Roddy Doyle tells the story of Paula Spencer's sobriety. (Reviewed 1/2/07)

 

Zoli,by Colum McCann (Random House, 352 pp., $24.95)

This drama-laced tale, based loosely on the true story of Romany poet Bronislawa "Papusza" Wajs, spans the Holocaust, the coming of the Communists, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. (1/9/07)

 

In The Country of Men,by Hisham Matar (Dial Press, 246 pp., $22)

This emotionally wrenching and gorgeously written novel about a young Libyan boy left alone with his mother when his dissident father disappears was shortlisted for last year's Man Booker prize. (2/6/07)

 

Lost City Radio,by Daniel Alarcón (HarperCollins, 272 pp., $24.95)

Twenty-something Peruvian-born novelist Alarcón's first novel is a haunting, beautifully written tale of lonely lives and broken hearts set in an unnamed Latin American dictatorship. (2/13/07)

 

Finn,by Jon Clinch (Random House, 287 pp., $23.95)

Novelist Jon Clinch offers a cruel but compelling back story for the life of Huck Finn's Pap. (2/27/07)

 

Then We Came to the End,by Joshua Ferris (Little, Brown, 387 pp., $23.99)

In this pitch-perfect office comedy, Joshua Ferris captures the angst of the pointlessly employed. (3/6/07)

 

Heyday,by Kurt Andersen (Random House, 640 pp., $26.95)

Kurt Andersen serves up a sprawling, messy, enthusiastic romp of a novel that takes readers on a wild ride through 1848 New York. (3/27/07)

 

Boomsday,by Christopher Buckley (Twelve, 318 pp., $24.99)

"Generation Whatever" turns on the boomers in Christopher Buckley's sharp, satiric gibe at political folly. (4/3/07)

 

Petropolis,by Anya Ulinich (Viking, 336 pp., $24.95)

Chubby Sasha Goldberg faces life as a biracial Jewish teenager in Asbestos 2, a town in Siberia, in this funny, fiery debut novel. (4/6/07)

 

The Yiddish Policemen's Union,by Michael Chabon (HarperCollins, 432 pp., $26.95)

Michael Chabon packs big ideas and an entertaining story into a noir detective tale that imagines a Jewish homeland in Alaska. (5/1/07)

 

After Dark,by Haruki Murakami (Knopf, 191 pp., $22)

Through a series of chance encounters in the wee hours of a Tokyo night, Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami captures the loneliness of modern life. (5/15/07)

 

Maytress,by Annie Dillard (HarperCollins, 224 pp., $24.95)

Pulitzer Prize-winner Annie Dillard's latest novel, set on Cape Cod, combines themes of marriage, forgiveness, and a life lived close to nature. (6/5/07)

 

The Shadow Catcher,by Marianne Wiggins (Simon & Schuster, 336 pp., $25)

Marianne Wiggins uses the life of legendary Western photographer Edward Sheriff Curtis as the basis of this novel that turns into a meditation on family and memory and ranges from Leonardo da Vinci to Route 66. (7/3/07)

 

The Septembers of Shiraz,by Dalia Sofer (Ecco Press, 336 pp., $24.95)

Iranian-born novelist Dalia Sofer uses 1981 as the backdrop to her story of a young Iranian woman whose father is arrested for the double crime of having lived well under the shah and for being Jewish. (7/17/07)

 

Loving Frank,by Nancy Horan (Ballantine, 368 pp., $23.95)

Frank Lloyd Wright's married, intellectual lover Mamah Borthwick Cheney steps out of the shadows to narrate this debut novel by journalist Nancy Horan. (8/7/07)

 

The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao,by Junot Díaz (Riverhead Books, 339 pp., $24.95)

In this debut novel, Junot Díaz tells the story of a Dominican-American "ghetto nerd" teen trapped in his own fantasies. (9/11/07)

 

Tree of Smoke,by Denis Johnson (FSG, 624 pp., $27)

After nearly a 10-year wait, fans of Denis Johnson were rewarded this year by the release of his latest novel, the gripping tale of a CIA agent toiling in Asia during the Vietnam War. (9/14/07)

 

Bridge of Sighs,by Richard Russo (Yale University Press, 229 pp., $25)

Richard Russo revisits familiar territory with this story of the reunion of a couple stuck in their upstate hometown and their high school friend who long ago left for Italy. (10/2/07)

 

Run,by Ann Patchett (HarperCollins, 304 pp., $25.95)

Two Boston families unexpectedly collide in Ann Patchett's latest novel, a tender examination of the nonbiological ties that truly create family. (10/9/07)

What we liked best: history

The Christian Science Monitor - the December 04, 2007 edition

 

Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed The World, by Margaret MacMillan (Random House, 432 pp., $27.95)

This thorough, absorbing account of Nixon's 1972 trip to China includes telling details and delicious anecdotes. (3/27/07)

 

Nixon and Kissinger: Partners In Power,by Robert Dallek (HarperCollins, 740 pp., $32.50)

Historian Robert Dallek offers new details on the Nixon-Kissinger power pairing and the rivalry and the dependency that shaped it. (5/15/07)

 

Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900,by Jack Beatty (Knopf, 512 pp., $30)

Beatty weaves together biography and history to create this powerful, angry examination of corporate greed and racism in post-Civil War America. (5/22/07)

 

The Perfect Summer,by Juliet Nicholson (Grove Press, 304 pp., $25)

This sparkling social history traces Edwardian English society on the brink of World War I and throughout the course of a withering heat wave that gripped England in the summer of 1911. (5/25/07)

 

Almost a Miracle,by John Ferling (Oxford University Press, 679 pp., $29.95)

Historian John Ferling argues that the American revolution succeeded only by the narrowest of margins. (7/3/07)

 

King, Kaiser, Tsar,by Catrine Clay (Walker & Co., 416 pp., $26.95)

England's King George V, Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm, and Russian Czar Nicholas II were the royal cousins who marched the world to World War I. (7/24/07)

 

Troublesome Young Men,by Lynne Olson (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 448 pp., $27.50)

Political courage takes center stage in this account of British politics in the late 1930s. Olson paints fascinating portraits of Winston Churchill, Neville Chamberlain, and their contemporaries, some of whom sacrificed their careers to their consciences. (8/7/07)

 

The Great Upheaval,by Jay Winik (Harper, 688 pp., $29.95)

Historian Jay Winik explores the revolutionary years of the late 18th century during which thinkers in France, Russia, and the US shaped a new vision of the rights of man. (9/18/07)

 

The Coldest Winder: America and the Korean War,by David Halberstam (Hyperion, 736 pp., $35)

David Halberstam's final book – a comprehensive, compelling examination of the Korean War – is one of his best. (9/25/07)

 

The Whisperers,by Orlando Figes (Metropolitan Books, 784 pp., $35)

British historian Orlando Figes conducted scores of interviews and combed through masses of private papers to cull the first-hand accounts that make up this chilling account of private life in Stalin's Russia. (10/30/07)

 

American Creation: Triumphs and Tragedies,by Joseph Ellis (Knopf, 283 pp., $26.95)

In these series of essays, historian Joseph Ellis makes a compelling case for a more realistic portrait of America's Founding Fathers. Ellis laments that too many writers work too hard to either demonize or canonize them. (11/13/07)

The 2007 books we liked best: nonfiction

Christian Science Monitor - the December 04, 2007 edition

 

Made to Stick, by Chip Heath and Dan Heath (Random House, 289 pp., $29.95)

A Stanford Business School professor and his brother examine the basics of the effective – and memorable – presentation of ideas. (1/23/07)

 

A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of A Boy Soldier, by Ishmael Beah (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 229 pp., $22)

This haunting memoir tells of the author's experience as a child soldier in Sierra Leone's civil war. (2/13/07)

 

The Kings of New York, by Michael Weinreb (Gotham Books, 288 pp., $26)

Sportswriter Michael Weinreb looks at the unlikely rise of America's best high school chess team at a public high school in Brooklyn. (3/6/07)

 

The Fathers of All Things, by Tom Bissell (Pantheon Books, 407 pp., $25)

In a book that combines memoir, travelogue, and history, Tom Bissell tells of the 2005 trip to Vietnam he took with his father, a former Marine and Vietnam vet. (3/13/07)

 

American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of A Religion, by Paul M. Barrett (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 304 pp., $25)

Paul Barrett offers complex, stereotype-defying portraits of seven different Muslims living in the US. (3/20/07)

 

The Atomic Bazaar,by William Langewiesche (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 179 pp., $22)

It may not be possible to write an enjoyable book about nuclear proliferation. But journalist William Langewiesche has at least written an intelligent and very readable work on the topic. (5/15/07)

 

Wild Trees: A Story of Passion and Daring,by Richard Preston (Random House, 294 pp., $25.95)

Mystery writer Richard Preston explores the world of the tallest trees and the scientists who spend their lives studying them. (4/24/07)

 

Animal, Vegetable, Miracle: A Year of Food Life,by Barbara Kingsolver with Steven L. Hopp and Camille Kingsolver (HarperCollins, 370 pp., $26.95)

Novelist Barbara Kingsolver and her family spend a year eating only what was grown or produced within 10 miles of their home. (5/8/07)

 

Legacy of Ashes: A History of the CIA,by Tim Weiner (Doubleday, 702 pp., $27.95)

A 2007 National Book Award winner, this history of the US intelligence by journalist Tim Weiner is compelling, if uncomfortable, reading. (8/14/07)

 

Indian Summer,by Alex von Tunzelmann (Henry Holt and Co., 416 pp., $30)

History reads like a novel in this exploration of the key figures involved in the creation of the modern states of India and Pakistan. (8/14/07)

 

The Rest is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century,by Alex Ross (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 624 pp., $30)

The "chaotic beauty" of 20th-century music is lost on many. New Yorker writer Alex Ross hopes to change that with this insightful piece of analysis. (10/23/07)

 

God's Harvard,by Hanna Rosin (Harcourt, 296 pp., $25)

Washington Post reporter Hanna Rosin profiles Patrick Henry College, the school that aims to be the Harvard of the evangelical world. (9/11/07)

 

Gomorrah,by Robert Saviano (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 320 pp., $25)

Italian journalist Robert Saviano takes readers on an eye-popping tour of La Camorra, the ruthless crime network headquartered in Naples. (11/6/07)

The business of sex

Geoffrey Alderman

December 27, 2007 10:10 AM

 

Earlier this month Harriet Harman, the minister for women, signalled a new government offensive against the freedom of the individual. On December 20, Harman announced that she was considering the introduction of legislation to criminalise payments for sex. "Do we think it's right in the 21st century that women should be in a sex trade," she asked, "or do we think it's exploitation and should be banned?"

Well, of course, put like that it's easy to see what answer Harman is expecting to the "very big debate" she has now apparently promised to launch early in the new year. No one - surely - is in favour of "exploitation", so - surely - we must all favour making it illegal for a man (or, less commonly, a woman) to pay for sex. An open and shut case - surely.

But the issue is much more complicated than Harman wants us to believe.

Sex is - like it or not - a commodity and paying for it is an economic transaction which, like any other economic transaction, involves a buyer and a seller. A man wants to enjoy a woman's body, and once he finds a woman willing to sell her body, temporarily, for this purpose the two parties to the transaction strike a price. The price is paid and the service is delivered. This - basically - is what prostitution involves.

I am not for one moment ignoring the exploitation that prostitution might involve. It might involve, as Harman says, the international trafficking in women by criminal gangs. It might involve slavery. It might involve sex with persons under 18 years of age. However, all these activities are already prohibited by law, as they should be.

But prostitution itself is not at present illegal. An indeterminate number of women - and men - in this country appear to follow successful careers as professional prostitutes. That is entirely their business, and the business of their clients. The state has no right to intervene, save to collect the tax due on the income lawfully generated.

The criminalisation of prostitution is most unlikely to be enforceable. The history of prohibition in the USA (1918-28) shows us that where there is a demand for a commodity, otherwise law-abiding people will go to any lengths to ensure a supply. If Miss Harman has her way, the police in this country would be engaged in a war they could never win, and would soon lose public sympathy, as in the USA, which no doubt explains why the Police Federation is so lukewarm to Harman's initiative.

Home secretary Jacqui Smith, in endorsing this initiative, claimed to recognise "that there is considerable support for us to do more to tackle the demand for prostitution". I know of no such "considerable support" but, in any case, "the demand for prostitution" emanates (does it not?) from basic sexual instinct. Exactly how does Miss Smith propose to tackle this "demand"? By adding bromide to our drinking water? I think not. But I do fear that some men, unable to cope with their sexuality, and facing prosecution if prostitution is criminalised, will engage instead in acts of unspeakable violence.

Is that what Smith and Harman really want? If so, they are certainly going the right way about it.

27 December 2007

Revisiting the Past

The Jakarta Post

Buru Island in Maluku was once one of the most isolated places in the world, a perfect spot for the New Order government to exile alleged subversives far from prying eyes. Janet Steele visits the island to see what remains of the past.

I didn't expect Buru Island to be so beautiful.  Maybe it was the warnings from friends – "be careful, Buru is not open to foreigners" -- or the stories I'd heard from Amarzan Loebis, who had been detained there for eight years, and who became my friend when I was writing about the history of Tempo magazine. 

Maybe it was the work of Buru's most famous former resident, writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer, but before I went to Buru I had the impression the island would be a sinister place – dark, swampy and malarial.  The Lonely Planet guide to Indonesia didn't help; it contained only a few paragraphs on Buru Island, all of which emphasized how difficult it was to get there.

From the air, Buru looks like paradise: clear blue-green water lapping at white sandy beaches, and a fringe of coconut palms.  As we approached the small landing strip at Namlea, I could see dusty-green mountains and the rugged outcroppings typical of karst formations.

 I tried to get my bearings, and wished I had printed out the one map I had found when I Googled "Buru Island". Getting out of the plane, I noticed how dry the air was.  Like Southern California, I thought – perfect for the eucalyptus trees that produce the oil for which the island is famous. 

We arrived on Buru on August 17.  I was traveling with Surya newspaper editor Dhimam Abror and young Surabayan businessman Imam Sulaiman. 

It's not clear just how welcome foreigners really are at Buru Island.  I had no problems entering Buru, but then we were the guests of Jalil Latuconsina, the adopted son of "Ibu Ratu" Nafsiah Wael, the widow of one of Buru's eight traditional kings. 

When we alighted from the small military plane that Pak Jalil had chartered, my passport was inspected and its contents carefully noted.  All of this seemed quite normal to me, but Pak Jalil later said that he had been embarrassed by it, as I was his guest.  

The airstrip, which the Japanese used during World War II, is on the outskirts of Namlea.  There is only one airport on the island, which at 11,117 square kilometers is a little larger than Bali.  We didn't pass another vehicle on the road into town.  In fact, there wasn't much to be seen on either side of the road other than the small eucalyptus trees, which seem to grow like weeds.  

We stayed at the Hotel Grand Sarah, which was built to accommodate President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during his recent visit.  A small stylish hotel, it is by far the best on the island.

 

Independence Day on Buru Island

I was eager to get to the Units, the local name for what is left of the "Rehabilitation Installation" at Waeapo, but after lunch our first stop was the office of the local regent where the Independence Day parade was in full swing.  In a staging area off to the side, about 20 "Putri Indonesia" in bright pink lipstick posed for the camera.  A group of teenaged "Freedom Fighters" watched the girls, and jostled one another as they waited their turn to march past the red-and-white-draped viewing stand.

 Taking all this in, I had to keep reminding myself that we were on Buru Island, a place where approximately 12,000 political prisoners had been detained without trial.  There was nothing to suggest that this place had been the site of one of the greatest and most systematic human rights abuses in Indonesia's history. 

One of the regent's VIP guests was Military District Commander Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Taufik, who had spent 10 years stationed in East Timor.  Although he was friendly enough, he also made a point of explaining why it was that Goenawan Mohamad, Amarzan Loebis, two Tempo writers and an Australian documentary filmmaker had been questioned by the police when they came to Buru Island last year.  There's no point in constantly stirring up reminders of the past, he said. 

By the time the last of the Freedom Fighters had marched by, it was too late in the day to go to the Units at Waeapo.  Back in the car, I asked where we were going.  To the regent's residence, my friends said, for a courtesy call.  This might be Buru, I thought, but it was clearly Javanese standards of etiquette that prevailed.

His residence is situated on a bluff overlooking the deep blue sea, with nothing but

white-capped waves and coconut palms as far as the eye can see.  The view reminded me of Bali's Nusa Dua – or of how Nusa Dua might have looked before anyone thought of building five-star resorts there. 

Regent Husnie Hentihu is a large jovial man, and he seemed interested in the possibility of developing tourism on Buru.  At his suggestion, we took a drive to Jikumerasa, a long stretch of sandy white beach, broken by an inlet where a freshwater lake empties out into the sea.  Small pieces of coral and cowry shells were scattered along the white sand, and the water looked calm and inviting – perfect for swimming. 

As we walked along the beach, I idly wondered what my three companions would do if I peeled off my clothes and dove in.

But swimming was not on the agenda.  Instead the plan was that we would return to the hotel, and get ready for the Independence Day program scheduled to begin at 8 p.m. at the residence. 

By the time we arrived at 9:30 p.m., the event was well under way.  As we searched for seats in the crowded pendopo, the MC was announcing the winners of the school competitions over an enormous loudspeaker system. Cameras flashed and music blared as the young singers, painters and poetry readers collected their huge golden trophies.

How could I possibly reconcile this homey event – which reminded me of my nephew's junior high school band concert in which "everybody gets a prize" -- with what I thought I knew about Buru? 

When the program was over, we made our way to the car.  With only headlights to guide the way across the windy field, I wished I hadn't left my flashlight in my luggage.  Trying not to trip, I looked up at the dark sky and quickly searched for the Southern Cross.  But the clouds had rolled in, and only a few stars were visible in the inky blackness.  We would go to the Units first thing tomorrow, my friends promised.

 

The Units at Waeapo

Waeapo is a good 45-minute drive from Namlea, even on the new road. Without a map, it's hard to get your bearings, especially once you lose sight of the sea.  As we drove, I thought of the detainees who had first made their way to Waeapo on foot. 

With only about 150,000 residents, Buru Island is sparsely populated, and the village of Savana Jaya comes up suddenly.  One of the first things you see is a large grassy field, with a long whitewashed building and small monument at one end.  The monument commemorates the dedication of the village in 1972.  The building is the Balai Kesenian, or the arts building.  An open-air shed with a dirt floor and a simple stage, it's the only physical structure that remains of the Rehabilitation Installation.  

Although my friends had been using their mobile phones almost constantly since we'd landed, I sent my first SMS from Buru to Amarzan Loebis. 

"I'm at the Arts Building on Savana Jaya," I wrote, "and I can't stop thinking about you."  As the text messages flew back and forth to Jakarta, I thought how strange it was that I was on Buru Island, with the ability to communicate instantaneously with my friend who had been detained here 30 years earlier -- at a time when it was one of the most isolated places in the world. 

Climbing back into the car, we drove down a side street and arrived at the small house of Koangit Iswani.  He is one of the 300 or so former detainees who decided to stay on in Buru. 

He is from East Java, where he had been active in a labor union.  He's also a religious man, and was the head of the Kemiri Muhammadiyah.  As Dhimam asked Koangit about his children, jotting the answers down in a small spiral notebook, I studied the room.  Six framed graduation photographs were displayed near the front door.  On the back wall was a clock commemorating the 52nd anniversary of the Indonesian Military Police, and what I later learned were the Arabic words for Allah and Muhammad. 

A strange assortment, I thought, and not at all what I would have expected in the home of a former political detainee.

Pak Koangit is in his seventies now, but still in good health with a ready laugh.  Although he's missing some teeth, he volunteered that this was the result of a motorcycle accident rather than physical abuse during his detention.  As a prisoner, he ran a small theater group, and he still teaches theater to the local children. 

After about an hour, Pak Koangit's daughter arrived at the house.  Like her father, she is an outspoken admirer of Indonesia's first president Sukarno -- which, after 1965, was grounds for suspicion if not outright imprisonment.  Like her five brothers and sisters, Sugeng Hayati is a university graduate.  She is also a member of the local legislature, and a member of Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. 

Her dream? That former detainees like her father can rehabilitate their good names. 

After leaving the house, we headed toward the village of "Mako" – short for Markas Komando -- passing hectare upon hectare of brilliant green rice fields.  Although nothing remains of the barracks that were built by the prisoners, the results of their forced labor are still evident in these fields, now farmed primarily by Javanese transmigrants. The detainees not only changed the landscape of Buru Island, they also changed the staple food.  Before the arrival of the detainees, the 40,000 residents of Buru had primarily eaten sagu, which is made from the sago palm. The prisoners built irrigated rice fields out of the forest – an especially astonishing feat given the most of the detainees were writers and intellectuals.

After a lunch of fried chicken at a small restaurant run by Javanese transmigrants, we stopped at the home of Pak Dasipin.  Although the furnishings in his house were spare, Dasipin quickly found six pink plastic chairs, and offered us tea and slices of sponge cake topped with sugary white icing.  A little boy peeked out shyly from behind the door to the living room. 

In the 1960s, Pak Dasipin had been a member of Pemuda Rakyat, the youth group of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).  At Buru he had married a local woman, and when the prisoners were released in 1979, he decided to stay on.  After several hours of trying to follow the heavily accented local Indonesian, I was happy to let Dhimam ask the questions. 

Just before we left, I asked Dasipin about something that had been on my mind since we'd first arrived in Buru. 

Although I had only interviewed Pramoedya Ananta Toer once, I said, at the time I had been struck by the clear, cold, consistency of his thinking -- and by his unwillingness either to forgive or forget.  But Pak Dasipin didn't appear to be angry at all.  Why?  Dasipin's answer was simple. 

"What's the point in harboring revenge?" he said.  "The one thing in life that's certain is that we're all going to die." 

Like Koangit, all he really wanted was the return of his good name.

 

History

By the time we left Dasipin's house, it was already mid-afternoon.  Pak Jalil explained that we were headed to the harbor at Namlea, where the prisoners had first landed.  From there we would take a small boat to the village of Kayeli.  The boat was basically a fiberglass tube, with broken plexiglass windows (shut tight) and only one exit. 

As we took off, bouncing and slapping along at breakneck speed – the captain leaning out the window to look for floating logs that could break the propeller -- I tried to plan what I would do if the boat overturned.  Swim toward the back and out, I thought, as we slammed into the waves. 

After about 30 minutes, we pulled up on the shore of Kayeli village.  My heart was still pounding as we rolled up our pants and clambered over the side of the boat.  Walking up the dark sand beach, we headed down the straight path past the village to the remains of a fort. 

To the right was mangrove swamp.  To the left were wooden houses, looking much as they had in 1861 when they were described this way by the British naturalist Alfred Russell Wallace: 

The whole place was dreadfully damp and muddy, being built in a swamp with not a spot of ground raised a foot above it, and surrounded by swamps on every side.  The houses were mostly well built, of wooden framework filled in with gaba-gaba (leaf stems of the sago palm) but as they had no whitewash, and the floors were of bare black earth like the roads, and generally on the same level, they were extremely damp and gloomy.

After a few minutes, we had attracted a parade of our own; in fact by the time we arrived at the fort, it seemed that every child in Kayeli was with us.  According to local lore, the fort was built in 1718 by the VOC.  But I wondered about this, as the meticulously accurate Wallace had noted that "the little fort, in perfect order, surrounded by neat grassplots and straight walks…was originally built by the Portuguese themselves."

The history of this fort -- like nearly everything else that I observed about Pulau Buru – was contested.  Was it Dutch-built or Portuguese?  Were most of the detainees there not because they were Communist Party members, but because of some mistake?  And if Buru was as bad as I had always heard, why had some of the detainees decided to stay?  

Back in Jakarta two days later, I asked Amarzan Loebis about this. 

He explained that in order to join the PKI, you needed to find two party members who would vouch for you and serve as witnesses during a swearing-in ceremony that was led by a party official. According to Amarzan, there was never any question as to who was and was not PKI.  Amarzan said that although he had never joined the PKI, he had been a journalist at Harian Rakyat.  Thus Amarzan's imprisonment at Buru was not a case of mistaken identity.  In the logic of the New Order, he "deserved" to be there. 

Amarzan also explained that when the detainees were freed, they were given a choice.  If they stayed on, they would be given 2 hectares of land, 2 head of cattle and a house.  For those who had been farmers in Java – and who didn't own any land -- the offer made sense. 

Amarzan said that he had promised himself that if he didn't find work within six months, he would return to Buru and accept the government's offer.  But he did find work – at Tempo magazine.

And what was Amarzan's impression of Buru today?  "The destruction of the barracks and all other traces of the unit was an effort to erase history and memory." Amarzan said. "They saved the arts hall only because the villagers were already using it." But "like all places of exile," he conceded, "Buru Island is beautiful." 

 

Getting to Buru

It is extremely difficult to find information on getting to and from Buru.  There is ferry service from Ambon, a trip that takes about 8 hours.  The Pelni ship Lambelu serves Namlea twice a month, and there is also a fast ship that is said to take either three or four hours, depending on whom you ask. 

Some of the best and most updated information can be obtained from the very helpful owners of the Baguala Resort, which is a good place to stay in Ambon while you are trying to arrange for travel to Buru. 

Merpati Nusantara Airlines serves Buru twice weekly, but beware.  When we returned to Ambon on August 19, we took the 9:30 a.m. Merpati flight.  The C-212 plane holds 28 passengers.  On August 19, however, the plane took 35 passengers.  There were seven people on the waiting list, and all of them got on board.   Most of them sat on other passengers' laps.

The Hotel Grand Sarah is located on Jl. A Yani.  Tel. (0913) 21301.

Religiously we are good, what about morally?

Tasa Nugraza Barley, Maryland

The Jakarta Post, 24 December 2007


When I lived in Pakistan for three years the one thing I was really proud of was that I was a Muslim from the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. When people asked where I was from I would proudly say, "I'm from Indonesia." In a country like Pakistan, where religion is a big deal, a Pakistani will be more than happy to know that the foreign guy he is talking to is a Muslim. So they would reply, "Indonesia? Oh, you are brother."

Indonesian Muslims are always proud that they are the majority and they are religious. Non-Muslims may be in the minority but they have the same kind of feeling: We are a religious nation! Muslim parents will beat their children if they don't want to pray daily, while Christian parents will yell at their children if they sleep in on a Sunday morning.

Indonesians claim that Western values are disgusting; therefore they condemn free sex and the use of condoms. Indonesians think that Westerners are immoral people who just can't control their animal-like behavior. "Those people are so sinful, they have sex before marriage, they drink alcohol, and they don't respect their parents."

Indonesian Muslims may not have the world's very greatest mosque, but I am sure they have some of the best mosques that have ever been built by humans. And for sure there are more mosques located in Indonesia than anywhere else in the world since there are more than 200 million Muslims.

In Jakarta, for example, you can find mosques everywhere. Every Friday they are full when the men go there to pray. During my six years of living in Jakarta I can tell you that I never saw one mosque that was not crowded on a Friday. Wow, what a religious country we have. Or do we?

Living more than ten months in America has made me realize that America, or at least some parts of it, is more conservative than people in the East think. Yeah, that's right, America is very conservative.

In America, if you are young, you have to show your ID every time you buy a beer or other alcoholic drink. You have to show your ID to go to a nightclub. Prostitution is only legal in the state of Nevada, and then only in some counties. It is even illegal in a city like Las Vegas.

You can still find girls lining up on the streets but they are very localized, and most likely you will never see them on major streets. And yes, right now there are four states that approve same-sex marriage, but there are many more states that still say same-sex marriage is out of the question.

In the area where I live, people smile at people they don't know on the streets more than I experienced in Jakarta. Children are so valued that every time a school bus stops to let children out, cars from every direction have to stop for safety reasons, no questions asked.

Seniors and people with disabilities are always treated well. They get special parking spots and other public advantages. When you open a door at a store or other public place you have to be aware if there is someone trying to enter behind you so you can hold the door until that person reaches it. When you do, most likely that person will say, "Thank you," and a smile will be your bonus.

"What about free sex?" you might ask. Well, it is true that there are a lot of people in America who consider sex to be no big deal, just a physical need. But even so, I would say things are not as bad as Hollywood movies suggest.

So America is more conservative than what you might think. But being conservative is different than being religious. Being religious means living your life based on religious values, while being conservative means believing in traditional values.

Religious values might be part of traditional values, if you think about it, but since many American conservatives feel religious values are just part of traditional values then those values are not absolute and they can be "twisted" a little bit based on current conditions. Such people would rather be called conservative than religious.

What about Indonesia? Are we religious enough? Yes we do condemn free sex, alcohol, and drugs, but are we really acting virtuous? Jakarta is once again a good example. Yes, the mosques are crowded on Fridays. But does that mean you can't find prostitutes in Jakarta? The answer is yes and yes, you can and it's easy!

Just go to places like Blok M or Kota in the evening and you will see girls in sexy dresses standing on the streets waiting for fancy cars to pick them up, or go to Taman Lawang for a different scene. These prostitutes are not even localized and they pick some of the major streets to "market" themselves.

You want to buy alcohol? Easy, just go to any store. If you are too shy to do that, you can still get pletokan (alcoholic drinks) at traditional stalls on the streets. And while we think that a condom campaign to stop AIDS is ridiculous, we can still buy condoms easily on the streets; you don't even have to look like an adult, just hand over your money.

Now, do I also have to mention the corruption? I guess not. People might say that the bad economy forces people to do things that religions prohibit in order to survive. But will a good economy automatically encourage people to be behave more religiously? Can the material side of life really be an excuse for sinful acts?

The writer is a founder of the organization Jakarta Butuh Revolusi Budaya (Jakarta Needs a Cultural Revolution). His personal blog is gue bukan monyet.

20 December 2007

The Goodness of Nations

Benedict O.G. Anderson

Public Lecture Series Hosted by Dr. Xolela Mangcu In collaboration with The Public Intellectual Life Research Project University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa 13 September 2006

If one looks at the immediate historical origins of nationalism, in the last quarter of the 18th century, one realizes that it arose in the context of a wider popular involvement in projects of emancipation. Jefferson’s famous Declaration of Independence speaks in the name of “The People,” but this people has as yet no name. The French Revolution had a huge impact in Europe, the Americas, the Caribbean, and later in Asia and Africa, precisely because of its universalist message, not its local “Frenchness.” In the 19th century nationalism typically was found in popular movements against emperors, monarchs, and aristocracies, and nationalists in different regions regarded themselves as “brothers” in a common struggle. The same was true for much of the decolonizing twentieth century.

Nkrumah, Nehru, Tito, Touré, Sukarno and U Nu had all grown to manhood under imperial rule of different kinds, and felt their affinities keenly, even when they did not like each other much on a personal level. Only after World War I, however, did the nation-state become “normal” across the globe with the initiation of the League of Nations.

At the same time, however, nationalism now has a long enough history for anyone to recognize its dark side. Almost all modern nations are divided along the lines of class, religious affinity, ethnicity, gender, ideology and generation. Many of them have behaved very badly at times, to their own members and to neighbours, and have fallen under the control of corrupt, cruel, and/or incompetent leaders. Why then do nations continue to have enormous emotional power, even in the age of globalization? How can they be felt as Good?

Some intellectuals have sought to explain this emotional hold by describing nationalism as a kind of secular religion, marked by the same unquestioning belief that the “religious religions” often command. But this view is unsatisfactory. Nations want to be members of the United Nations, along with perhaps 200 others, therefore with quite modest and local claims.
They wish to be recognized and respected by “other nations,” which, like them have a lot in common, in spite of local idiosyncracies. A United Religions seems quite unfeasible, however, because each religion makes strong claims to “absolute truth,” and most believe they have a global sphere of action. It is not that the nation lacks a utopian horizon, as I shall explain later, but that this horizon is intrahistorical. No nation looks forward to happiness in Heaven, or torment in Hell. What it fears is quite earthly: the possibility of extinction through genocide.

It in this historical-utopian framework that I would like to suggest to you three loci for the goodness of the nation, though you may initially find them pretty strange.

The first of these is the Future. The nation-state form is the first in human history to be fundamentally bound to the idea of Progress.
Prior to the rise of nationalism people were accustomed to the idea that dynasties and empires rose and fell. Peoples merged with others, got assimilated, and sometimes were killed off without much notice being paid.
It is useful to look at a map of the Roman Empire at its height, stretching from the borders of Scotland to the southern marches of Egypt, from today’s Portugal over to Iran. How many peoples mentioned by Roman historians and statesmen have either changed their names or disappeared. In fact, only a very few, which do not include the Romans themselves, have survived. But the Nation’s face is turned to a limitless Future, and it expects, under the banners of Development, to keep moving ahead. What is Good about this?

We can get an answer from a strange passage in a famous lecture given 110 years ago by the great German comparative sociologist Max Weber. Most of the talk was devoted to the horrible mess into which his country had fallen. The dominant nobility had lost all ideas and energy, and thought only of clinging to its privileges. The complacent middle class was sunk in mindless consumerism and political opportunism. The workers were politically illiterate and incapable of providing national leadership. After this gloomy analysis, however – analogies to which one find in the press of many countries today – he suddenly said something quite astonishing. “If…we could rise from the grave thousands of years from now, we would seek the traces of our own being in the physiognomy of the race of the future, Even our highest, our ultimate terrestrial ideals are mutable and transitory. We can not hope to impose them on the future, But we can wish that the future recognizes in our nature the nature of its own ancestors. We wish, by our labour and our being, to become the forefathers of the race of the future.” Let me quickly quickly explain that Weber does not use the “racist” word Rasse, but rather Geschlecht, which can mean gender, ancestry, lineage, and race in the loose way that permits Germans to speak of the human race (menschliche Geschlecht).

The horizon here is uncounted thousands of years into the Future. Weber is thinking about a Future-Germany, which may have no nobility, middle class, or workers, and may share no late 19th century ideals and hopes. But this Future-Germany imposes profound moral obligations on living Germans. They must be worthy of the Future, so that they can be recalled honorably as remote ancestors. At the same time, these uncountable Future- Germans are part of Germany. Though weirdly put, what Weber said is actually replicated all the time in every nation’s discourse. We are constantly asked so save the environment and national treasures for “future generations.” We pay taxes for schools we will not attend, for projects that will only mature after we are dead, support armies unlikely to fight in our lifetime. If war comes, we may be asked to lay down our lives not just for our fellow-citizens, but for the unborn. Yet between us and the unborn there is a central difference. Most South Africans can think of many fellow-South Africans that they hate or despise, according to their social and political situation: die-hard racists, superviolent tsotsis, merciless corporate bosses, corrupt politicians, etc. etc. For such people, sacrifices will not willingly be made. But unborn South Africans have none of these characteristics, or any others than futurity, even if one could imagine among them descendants of those one currently dislikes. This is exactly why one can willingly make sacrifices for them.

The other side if Weber’s coin is just as interesting. He says that the Future asks us to be worthy ancestors. He himself was deeply ashamed of his German contemporaries. This shame is basic to the Goodness of the Nation. If we are incapable of being ashamed for our country, we do not love it. It is a shame that can be very valuably mobilized. You will all be able to think of your own examples. What comes to my mind are those mothers in Buenos Aires who year by year held quiet demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo on behalf of all those young people who were “disappeared” in their thousands by the military regime of General Videla. These mothers wanted justice, of course, but what they tried to arouse was a general shame among their fellow-Argentinians, a shame in the face of unborn Argentinians. Hence, a good nationalist slogan is always “Long Live Shame!”

You will not, I think, be surprised, if I now turn to the uncounted numbers of the National Dead. National history books usually foreground heroes of whom everyone is asked to be proud. Of course, there always national villains too, though they are fewer. Most striking, however, is that the anonymous collective dead are never wicked. Chinese and Korean nationalists have been outraged by the regular visits of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine commemorating all the Japanese who died in modern wars, and one can understand why -- given the real horrors inflicted on the two countries in the first half of the 20th century by Japanese imperial forces. But if one enters the shrine one gets another kind of impression, for it is full of unfinished diaries and pathetic letters written by young peasant conscripts who died fulfilling what they believed was their national duty.
Living Japanese see these letters and diaries as moral challenges to live up to the obligations implied by the youngsters’ sacrifices.

In other national cemeteries, a different kind of Goodness emerges. The inscriptions on the graves are typically very short, often just a simple name. The viewer is told nothing sociological at all – parentage, region of origin, religious affinity, marital status, and so on. He will not learn how many enemies a dead man killed, or whether he treated his wife cruelly, abandoned his children, or went to prison for a crime. On could say that National Death has cleared his moral books. And it makes no difference if the war in which he died was a good or bad war. The most moving monument to the National Dead in the USA is Maya Lin’s austere memorial to those Americans who died in what is now generally accepted to be the “very bad” Vietnam War. What the monument leaves out, of course, are the 3 million or so natives of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in whose deaths those dead Americans played their own small part. When I recently read about President Mbeki attending the memorial commemorations for the Boers who fought and died in their war against the British Empire, it seemed to me that a similar process is at work in South Africa. His gesture points forward to a time in the future (two generations?) when even apartheid will be remembered as a “national tragedy,” which must be simultaneously remembered and forgotten by all South Africans. By then, maybe, young Afrikaners will have learned to be attached to the Apartheid Museum and that of Soweto.

To summarize the argument so far, the Goodness of the Nation can only be understood by remembering that the Nation includes the ghosts of the dead and the phantoms of the still unborn, who are, for different reasons unqualifiedly good. But do living members of the Nation not make some contributions? I believe they do. The most obvious example are “collective children.” The word “collective” must be emphasized. First, because understood collectively, they can be regarded as the avant-garde of the unborn still awaiting their turn at human life. But collectivity also allows us to set aside all the faults of real and individual children whom we know personally or read about in the newspapers: spoilt, lazy, bullying, ungrateful, disobedient, drug-addicted, even criminal. Second, however, is their peculiar political status as “minor” citizens. It is of course impossible to prevent youngsters under 18 (or 19 or 21) from learning about politics from TV and the chatter of their elders, or from participating in riots and demonstrations. But the key thing is that they can not vote. From one angle, this could be regarded as a deprivation. But from another, it protects them collectively from responsibility for, and contamination by, the everyday squalors of even democratic political participation. They have no votes to be sold or bought, they are not part of national armies which may be repressive of the citizens, they have no incomes, so no chance to cheat on their taxes. If they happen to be racists or vulnerable to mean ethnic prejudices they can not legally act upon them in the electoral process. They can not be blamed if this horrible politician is elected, or that horrible political party takes power.

A kind of benevolent fiction is at work: “our kids collectively” are always good, not least because at every minute they are gaining new infant members, and losing others to murky adulthood. It is the same type of fiction that is observable in the field of sexuality. In spite of the fact that children develop sexual feelings very early, and start menstruating or ejaculating in their early teens, modern nations draw a firm and arbitrary line between adult sexuality ( citizens can marry only at these ages, may have non-marital sexual relations at others, etc). After 16 or 17 the children become, so to speak, overnight “sexual voters,” responsible for the consequences of their sexual behavior: not before.

And adults? Even here there are possibilities of a kind of Goodness. The rise of the Inter-Nation Olympic Games historically occurred close to the arrival of the League of Nations. They seemed like a harmless substitute for war. But television changed everything, giving a new kind of importance even to intra-nation athletics. The enormous amount of watching time devoted to sports shows us the modern importance of a continuous parade of perfect national bodies – healthy, strong, fast, powerful, elegant, beautiful and often “winning.” These young men and women are read as synecdoches of the Good Beauty of the Nation, which is why reports of doping and steroids feel so calamitous. But these young beauties pass us like glow-worms at night. We do not see what happens to brain-damaged boxers after they retire from the ring, or the ruined knees of tennis-players and footballers. (New beauties arrive to replace them.) Just as we do not see the Marlboro man when he undergoes chemotherapy. In this way mortality is kept at bay, and the Nation remains young, strong, and lovely.

Another site of Goodness occurred to me some years ago in the United States. If you are old enough, you may remember the calamitous Iraq-Iran of the 1980s. The US traumatized by the Iranian Revolution’s seizure of hostages in the American Embassy in Teheran, became a close ally of Saddam Hussein, and armed him to the teeth – also with the poison gas that he later used against rebel Kurds. By the time of the Gulf War, this lethal friendship had necessarily been forgotten. At that moment I was struck by newspaper photographs showing American warplanes on which the pilots had scrawled in large letters Saddam Bend Over! In popular language, this meant, we are coming to sodomize you. Not long afterward, Bill Clinton was elected president, with huge popular support in many quarters, but also arousing violent hatred amongst rightwingers, who eventually impeached him. But there were never any bumper stickers reading Bill Bend Over. Why not?

Here it is good to remember the style of personal address which characterizes social movements and national discourse. It is the language of Brothers and Sisters. Leaders of modern nation-states can not address those they lead and rule as “my children,” as monarchs and clerics were wont to do in the past. “Brothers and Sisters” has nothing to do with a citizen’s age, marital status, class position, or ideology. But does have lot to do with ideas of equality and family intimacy. My own belief is that this form of address is underpinned by a metaphoric incest taboo. Brothers and sisters are supposed to give each other unconditional love, but one from which anything erotic must be excluded. This is, one could say, the highest form of Love, and thus a great Good. The meaning of this in the political life of the nation is that citizen solidarity is that good, austere kind, from which sexuality is absolutely barred. Individual citizens can have any kind of “private” sexual life that they want and can legally get away with, but in the public arena this is out of the question. An American citizen can advertize his eagerness to sodomize Saddam Hussein, but he can not do the same for his own president. He can be a public beast overseas, but not at home.

In this light, it is not surprising that most nations identify their country as the Motherland. This is, metaphorically, the mother to whom we – all of us – owe our existence, our permanent gratitude, and our austere devotion. She in inaccessible to us, but she looks after us all, with a love that is impartial and transcends anything sexual. So she too forms a source of the Goodness of the Nation.

It is quite possible that readers may find the argument of these pages too abstract and philosophical. So let me switch registers for a few closing remarks.

No book on nationalism is more down-to-earth than Michael Billig’s wonderful Banal Nationalism. What he wishes to stress is that nationalism is above all a matter of everyday Habit, dull, only semi-conscious, and absolutely ordinary. It is the powerful, almost unseen glue that keeps the members of complex and large societies from behaving much worse to each other than they otherwise would do. If I could be allowed to extrapolate from Billig to speak of South Africa – but not South Africa alone - I would mention the following. First, the television weather reports which, day in day out, incessantly nationalize Nature by showing “South African weather” extending up into the stratosphere, and quite distinct from the almost invisible Namibian, or Mozambiquan weathers. Second, South African newspapers, which like national newspapers everywhere, have separate sections every day for National News, and foreign or international news. Third, “international sports” in newspapers and on television, which nonetheless quietly exclude any sports in which South Africans do not ordinarily participate. Fourth, logo-maps – maps giving merely the outline boundary of the country without any written information, but instantly recognized by South Africans, who would probably not recognize the logo-map of Burma, Hungary, or Uruguay. These logomaps one sees everywhere, but barely notices. Like the oxygen we are barely aware of breathing, but can no do without.

Though Billig’s work is often extremely funny, he is not writing to “debunk” nationalism, which in fact he regards, in the tradition of the great Norbert Elias, as a profoundly civilizing process. He believes, as I do, that it is a mistake to over-value the significance of “human rights,” in contrast to the national rights of citizens. “Human rights,” with its abstract universalist valence, is too easily used as a mask for opportunist military and economic interventions by world powers, and too simply used to override local custom and tradition. It is also a doctrine, which, with all its real value, still has a missionary, topdown smell to it. The rights of citizens make more modest claims, but they come from, as it were, the bottom up, and require for their realization real citizen activity. And they were central to the original self-emancipatory thrust of early nationalism.

I do not wish to single out the US in any special way, but I have worked there on and off for over 40 years, so can speak from long personal observation, even though I am not an American citizen. When I arrived as a student in 1958, racial segregation was still largely unchallenged, “red Indians” were visible only as villains in Hollywood Westerns, women could get divorced only with great difficulty, while abortion was illegal and dangerous; gays and lesbians were terrified, semi-secret minorities regularly abused by the police and other authorities. Today, the legal structure of segregation is gone and Martin Luther King has his own National Day, red Indians have become, instructively, “First Americans,” and are on the gentle offensive; for women divorce is quite simple and abortion mostly legal, while there has been a huge increase in the number and visibility of female politicians at all levels; gays and lesbians are already allowed to marry in some states, and the number will surely increase. If one asks for an explanation of these changes, “human rights” will be quite useless. In every case, the process of emancipation has been based on the claims of American citizenship. “As an American citizen,” Mr X or Ms Y can not be treated as anything less than any another citizen. Here, locally, we are back with another old source of the Goodness of the Nation. But this has nothing to do with American peculiarity, South Africa’s Constitution is even better.

07 November 2007

The Global Nexus - Kebangkitan 1908 dan Kemacetan (?) 2008

Suara Pembaruan - 4 Nov 07

9

Christianto Wibisono

Kepala Divisi Kriminal Komersial Polisi Diraja Malaysia Ramli Yusuf sedang menghadapi dakwaan ACA, Anti Corruption Agency, KPK-nya Malaysia. Ramli dituduh menyalahgunakan wewenang memperkaya diri hingga memiliki properti senilai RM 27 juta. Ramli mengeluh bahwa ia dijadikan korban politik dan berseru kepada LSM dan media internet Malaysia kini agar membela hak asasinya. Padahal, ketika berkuasa di Kepolisian Malaysia, Ramli termasuk galak dan arogan terhadap media.

Di Jakarta, Jumat (2/11/07), Laksamana Sukardi, mantan Menteri Negara BUMN selaku Komisaris Utama Pertamina, ditetapkan sebagai tersangka dalam kasus dugaan korupsi pada penjualan kapal tanker raksasa atau very large crude carrier (VLCC) Pertamina.

Pada Senin (29/10), pengacara TIME Mulya Lubis selaku Ketua Chapter mendampingi Huguette Libellle, Presiden Transparency Internasional (TI), mendorong Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono agar proaktif memimpin kampanye antikorupsi pada tingkat ASEAN. Hari Sabtu ( 27/10) di Washington, Bank Dunia mengumumkan peringkat Indonesia pada nomor 123 dari 178 negara dalam survei Doing Business. Paralel dengan keluhan pengusaha tentang korupsi yang dalam indeks TI berada pada nomor 143 dari 179 negara. Pada Rabu (31/10), WEF (World Economic Forum) mengumumkan peringkat daya saing dunia, dan Indonesia stagnan pada nomor 54. Sementara Tiongkok dari nomor 54 tahun lalu melejit ke nomor 34.

Wartawan senior asal Filipina Eduardo Lachica dalam Seminar Global Nexus Institute, Kamis (1/11), di Washington DC dengan pesimis menanyakan apakah Pemerintah Indonesia dapat mengamankan program REDD yang diajukan untuk Peta Jalan Bali dari ancaman korupsi karena merebaknya kasus illegal logging dan lemahnya penegakan hukum. Korupsi penyalahgunaan wewenang politik sangat sulit dibuktikan secara legal formal, sehingga menurut tajuk The Jakarta Post, Juwono Sudarsono menjadi Defenseless Minister of Defense. Menteri Pertahanan yang tidak mampu bertahan dari tekanan politik, kekuatan unsur legislatif untuk meredam dan meralat ucapan bahwa parlemen terkait dengan konflik kepentingan.

Euforia Demokrasi

Negara berkembang seperti Indonesia memang terjebak dalam euforia demokrasi dan reformasi dengan seolah-olah mengebiri kekuasaan eksekutif presiden. Tapi, membagi porsi kekuasaan kepada legislatif dan judikatif, yang keduanya merasa juga berhak menikmati dan "men-tunai-kan kuasa yang diembannya" sebagai imbalan bahwa mereka telah menunaikan kewajiban sebagai penyelenggara negara yang pantas digaji tinggi.

Sebetulnya kalangan elite Indonesia mirip "Soeharto kecil" yang tidak merasa bersalah dan tidak mempunyai wacana tentang konflik kepentingan. Di Barat pun sampai sekarang masih ada elite yang mempraktekkan tumpang-tindih konflik kepentingan, tapi transparansi dan kekuatan publik opini dan media massa cukup kuat menangkalnya, Sebab supremasi hukum benar-benar ditegakkan terhadap koruptor eselon tinggi sekalipun.

Amerika Serikat adalah induk segala money politics. Tapi, justru karena itu AS juga siap dengan perangkat perundang-undangan yang jelas dan berkepastian hukum untuk mencegah dan menindak terjadinya korupsi penyelenggara negara. Suatu penyalahgunaan kekuasaan publik, untuk kepentingan pribadi, golongan, keluarga, kroni dan jabatan politik. AS sadar benar bahwa manusia pada dasarnya kurang sempurna dan cenderung menyalahgunakan atau ingin menikmati kekuasaan secara berlebihan, dengan alasan telah berjasa dan menang serta dipercaya rakyat untuk memerintah.

Sebaliknya, di negara berkembang elite merasa pasti bermoral dan berdedikasi. Tidak akan korupsi sebab semua sudah tersedia. Juga merasa upeti dari konglomerat bukan korupsi, melainkan sesuatu yang layak, lumrah, dan bahkan wajib. Semuanya campur-aduk, tidak ada pembukuan terpisah atau sengaja menjadi ruwet dan tidak bisa diaudit karena tidak ketahuan mana batasan harta pribadi, sumbangan donator, atau hibah dari penghibah misterius yang tidak bisa ditelusuri apa dan siapanya. Akibatnya terjadi korupsi model dana non-bujeter, di mana kalangan birokrat memeras pengusaha dan masyarakat untuk dibagi dan dinikmati secara arisan dan kolektif sesama politisi. Dengan harapan "demokratisasi korupsi" itu diampuni. Atau paling sedikit tidak ada yang berani menindak, karena yang harus ditangkap banyak orang penting dan penguasa bisa terlibat. Inilah yang menjadikan pemberantasan korupsi di Indonesia dan Malaysia sekarang ini dianggap hanya berani kepada pihak pecundang, mantan elite politik atau lawan politik yang harus disingkirkan, dilemahkan atau dikorbankan. Ini akan menghasilkan siklus politik balas dendam, takut mundur, ngotot berkuasa karena hanya kursi jabatan yang bisa menjamin impunitas para kleptokrat (penguasa korup).

Hidup Mewah

Indonesia dan Dunia Ketiga hanya menjiplak money politics AS tanpa menerapkan batasan undang-undang yang tegas mengendalikan money politics dan konflik kepentingan. Di AS seorang presiden harus segera me-masrahkan aset bisnis dan pribadi keluarganya kepada blind trust management independent. Sehingga jelas berapa kekayaan dan penghasilan pribadi Bill Clinton, George W Bush, atau Barack Obama. Kekayaan mereka mungkin hanya beberapa atau belasan juta dolar. Sedang dana kampanye politik bisa puluhan, bahkan ratusan juta dolar, tapi semua transparan. Bila kebetulan pelobi atau calo politik menyumbang dan ternyata terlibat kriminal maka tim pengelola dana kampanye Clinton atau Bush atau Obama, tinggal menyisihkan dana tersebut untuk dihibahkan kepada lembaga sosial. Masalah dana kampanye partai dan Senator serta anggota Kongres juga ditata ketat dan transparan untuk menghindari "pemerasan politik" oleh jajaran legislatif terhadap masyarakat dan pengusaha.

Di Indonesia selama Soeharto berkuasa praktek simbiose parasitis antara pengusaha, masyarakat, dan pejabat merupakan rahasia umum. Sebab tidak seorang pun pegawai negeri atau penyelenggara negara yang bisa hidup bergelimang aset mewah hanya dari gaji yang nilainya kecil. Tapi, tidak ada yang merasa bersalah atau korupsi. Semua merasa

wajar karena sudah berjasa menjadi penyelenggara negara dan memberikan kemudahan kepada dunia bisnis dan masyarakat. Maka wajar, afdol, dan sah untuk kaya- raya.

Korupsi pada tingkat jajaran elite politik Orde Baru masih diteruskan pada masa transisi ini. KPK sudah berani menggebrak bahkan sampai ke tingkat pejabat Deputy Gubernur BI. Malah Ketua BPK pun akan didengar keterangannya. Orde Baru memang telah diganti Orde Reformasi. Tapi, sekarang kalangan elite Orde Reformasi telah memeratakan gaya Orde Baru, money politics tanpa kontrol dan kritik, di mana seorang Menhan tidak berdaya dan harus menyerah kepada "demokratisasi korupsi" . Sistem korupsi bersama akan tetap menggerogoti bangsa ini. Hasilnya, dalam semua peringkat kita tetap terpuruk, walaupun kita sudah "berdemokrasi" 10 tahun, tapi tanpa efektivitas pengendalian korupsi politik. Perlu suatu transformasi institusional dan penegakan supremasi hukum yang berani merambah pelaku money politics. Hingga merupakan pamungkas perubahan watak klektopkrat menjadi meritokrat. Tanpa transformasi institusional itu maka gebrakan Komite Bangkit Indonesia juga hanya ibarat jalan-jalan di tempat, seperti kata Wiranto. Jauh dari kinerja para perintis Kebangkitan Nasional 99 tahun yang lalu, pada 20 Mei 1908.

Penulis adalah pengamat masalah nasional dan internasional

20 October 2007

Pramoedya Ananta Toer's "Arok of Java: A Novel of Early Indonesia"

Periplus Bookshop Kemang cordially invites you to join us in a celebration for the publication of Toer's latest English language publication.

We are going to have a meet and greet with Max Lane, the translator for this book.

And with our guest of honor, Ibu Pram and daughter - Titiek will also be attending. This event will be taking place on:

Day & date : Saturday, October 27, 2007

Time : 11 am – onwards

Venue : Komp. Villa Kemang (Hero Kemang)

Jl. Kemang Selatan 1 – South Jakarta

 

Book Description

It is the 13th century in Java. Rebelliousness stirs among peasant farmers and Brahmin priests alike. Slavery has returned and men, women and children labour to find gold for Java's rulers. Bearing the symbols of spiritual power, a young scholar-bandit and rebel appears, called Arok – "he who upturns everything". As the rebellion spreads, it is Arok himself whom the rulers employ to suppress it. Thus emerges one of the epic political conspiracies of Javanese history. At stake is power in Java itself, the Lady Consort Dedes, and an end to slavery and oppression.

This novel presents Pramoedya's version of a great legend emerging out of the mists of historical past, is a tale of palace politics, conspiracy and revolution. It sets out the beginning of historical process that began on Java and gives the most vivid picture of the political, cultural and social forces which Pramoedya sees as having remained crucial until even today: the castes of the Brahman intellectuals, the Satria military and the Sudra, the people, the farmers, the artisans and labourers.

About the Author

Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) was born in Blora, central Java, the eldest son a headmaster and activist. He wrote more than 40 works, including novels, short stories, plays, history, literary criticism and more than 400 newspaper essays. His Buru Tetrology has been hailed as a brilliant work of epic historical fiction.

Pramoedya is survived by his second wife, Maemunah, with whom he had five children. He had three children from his first marriage, 16 grandchildren and three great-grandchildren.

For further information please contact:

Tessa

Marketing & Communications
PERIPLUS BOOKINDO

Mobile: 0818 0649 6007

Email: teresa@javabooks.co.id

Sekelumit Cerita di Balik Penyusunan Tesaurus Bahasa Indonesia

dari: Forum Pembaca Kompas

Awal Desember 2006 yang lalu terbit, Tesaurus Bahasa Indonesia(TBI)â€"agaknya karya pertama dalam sejarah dari jenis ini. Buku yang diterbitkan Gramedia ini mendapat sambutan yang cukup bagus. Dalam waktu singkat, ia sudah mengalami cetak ulang.

Yang menarik, tesaurus setebal 736 halaman ini dikerjakan seorang diri. Penyusunnya Eko Endarmoko, anggota redaksi Jurnal Kebudayaan Kalam (sekarang on-line) di Komunitas Utan Kayu, Jakarta.

Eko Endarmoko, yang pemalu dan pendiam ini, baru sekarang menceritakan pengalamannya menyusun karya yang sulit dan bertahun-tahun dikerjakan ini.

Tesaurus ini adalah buah dari dorongan terus-menerus akan keperluan mendapatkan kata paling jitu sewaktu merangkai kalimat. Hampir separuh kandungan tesaurus itu berasal dari setumpuk carikan kertas berisi kata-kata bersinonim yang saya catat berdikit-dikit sejak kuliah di tahun 1980-an. Kira-kira sepuluh tahun kemudian, demi lebih cepat mendapatkan sesuatu kata sekaligus mencegah carikan-carikan kertas tadi berceceran, semua catatan tadi lalu saya garap dengan program pengolah kata.

Niat membukukannya, yang muncul sesudah melihat seluruh bentuk kasarnya terketik di layar, terdesak dan bahkan sempat terlupakan beberapa lamanya, oleh rutinitas kerja sebagai penyunting di penerbit Pustaka Utama Grafiti.

Sekitar pertengahan tahun 1997, yaitu saat saya mulai bergabung dalam Jurnal Kebudayaan Kalam, adalah momen penting yang memungkinkan TBI menemukan bentuknya seperti sekarang. Jurnal Kalam, Teater Utan Kayu, dan Galeri Lontarâ€"ketiganya merupakan sayap kesenian Komunitas Utan Kayuâ€"tak lain dari apa yang biasa diringkas dengan sebutan TUK atau Teater Utan Kayu.

Rekan-rekan saya, para kurator-sastrawan di sana, Nirwan Dewanto, Sitok Srengenge, Hasif Amini (dan sebelum ini: Ayu Utami), memerhatikan persoalan bahasa Indonesia dengan tekun, cerewet, dan bersemangat. Bekerja sama dengan mereka memberi rangsangan tersendiri bagi saya untuk meneruskan penyusunan tesaurus ini, sekalipun praktis kami cuma berkumpul sekali seminggu, tiap Rabu, antara lain untuk rapat menyusun program acara tiga bulan ke depan.

Bekerja di TUK atau KUK memang setengah "kerja sukarelawan". Maka tiap orang punya kegiatan samping. Kegiatan samping saya adalah menjadi penyunting bahasa, antara lain bagi terjemahan yang akan diterbitkan oleh lembaga KITLV (Koninklijke Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde) Belanda yang di Jakarta diwakili Jaap Erkelens. Bung Jaap sering datang ke Kedai Tempo dan kami duduk berdua bekerja di depan tumpukan naskah. Bung Jaap dengan demikian juga jadi bagian dari KUK, sebagaimana tiap orang yang kerap datang dan bekerja di sana. Bahkan Bung Jaap pernah jadi "kurator" pameran karikatur pers Belanda dari masa revolusi Indonesia (Februari-Maret 2006).

Oleh KLTV juga, saya disponsori untuk kerja penelitian di Leiden, Belanda, selama Mei-Agustus 2001 dalam menyiapkan TBI. Saya senang rekan-rekan di TUK merelakan, bahkan mendorong, saya meninggalkan kerja selama itu. Saya harap hasil kerja itu tidak mengecewakan.

19 October 2007

Memahami Aceh dalam Kerumitan Indonesia

Koran Tempo - Jum'at, 19 Oktober 2007

Opini

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, peneliti senior pada Imparsial, Jakarta

Sekarang lebih mudah memahami Aceh ketimbang Indonesia. Berbeda dengan dahulu, lebih mudah memahami Indonesia--yang akhirnya berkembang menjadi permakluman politik--daripada memahami Aceh, yang kemudian melahirkan resistansi politik.

Mungkin karena Aceh adalah dunia mikro, dan Indonesia adalah dunia makro, lebih mudahlah memahami Aceh daripada memahami Indonesia. Namun, antropolog Clifford Geertz telah mengingatkan tentang Aceh yang cenderung ekstrover sehingga cenderung bergerak evolutif. Sedangkan Indonesia--akibat dominasi budaya Indonesia Dalam yang agraris dan membatin--cenderung introver dan bergerak involutif.

Seturut itulah, Aceh lebih mudah dipahami karena kemikroannya, sifatnya yang ekstrover, dan geraknya yang evolutif. Indonesia tentunya semakin susah--kalau belum memusingkan--dipahami karena kemakroannya, sifatnya yang introver, dan geraknya yang involutif.

Singkatnya, anatomi Aceh itu sederhana. Anatomi Indonesia itu rumit. Namun, bukankah, pasca-Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Helsinki, Aceh berada dalam Indonesia? Karena itu, apakah cukup memadai untuk memahami kesederhanaan Aceh tanpa kaitannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia?

Tengoklah laporan International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Komplikasi Pasca-Konflik". Kiranya ini sebuah contoh yang ideal bagaimana memahami kesederhanaan Aceh tanpa kaitannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia. Anatomi Aceh--yang diwakili oleh kajian tentang evolusi Gerakan Aceh Merdeka dan Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA)--demikian lancar diuraikan tanpa mengaitkannya dengan kerumitan Indonesia, serta dengan mudah dapat diramalkan bagaimana jadinya di esok hari.

ICG melaporkan, pasca-MOU Helsinki, ada ketenangan di Jakarta, dan terjadi kegelisahan yang semakin kuat di Aceh perihal masa depan perdamaian yang sedang dilangsungkan. Pasalnya sederhana saja, yakni menyangkut evolusi dalam tubuh GAM dan BRA. Dan kedua kelembagaan ini dikendalikan oleh orang GAM. Meskipun ICG mengakui orang GAM bukan pelaku satu-satunya yang menggelisahkan, anatomi pelaku lain tak juga diuraikan oleh ICG. Mungkin terlalu rumit.

Transformasi politik yang berdampak sosial yang terjadi pasca-pemilihan kepala daerah (pilkada) yang digelar sejak Desember 2006 digambarkan oleh ICG dengan terang-benderang dan sederhana bahwa "para pemilih di Aceh tampaknya telah mengganti elite korup yang satu dengan yang lain". Pejabat baru melahirkan jaringan patronase baru.

Perihal patronase baru bukanlah hal yang unik. Di mana pun dunia politik hidup dan mengalami pembaharuan, baik secara demokratis maupun nondemokratis, pastilah melahirkan jaringan patronase baru yang seturut dengan penguasa baru. Dalam sejarah kesultanan Aceh, setiap muncul sultan dan sultanah baru, apalagi dari wangsa baru, dengan segera terbentuk jaringan patronase baru. Dalam sejarah Indonesia, begitu Soeharto menjatuhkan Soekarno, maka segala jaringan patronase Soekarno dihancurkan dan dibentuk jaringan patronase yang Soeharto-sentris. Sejarawan Ong telah menguraikan keniscayaan sejarah tentang kemunculan kaum orang kaya baru setelah kemunculan penguasa baru.

Hal penting lain yang tak pernah dikaji adalah bahwa pilkada Aceh itu telah memutuskan dominasi oligarki partai nasional yang sudah selaras dengan pelaku birokrasi dan militer sejak masa Orde Baru. Ternyata, klaim politik bahwa hanya partai politik nasional, birokrasi, dan serdadu yang bisa melahirkan pemimpin tidak sepenuhnya benar. Gerakan protes juga bisa melahirkan pemimpin yang bisa terpilih oleh rakyat. Klaim politik hitam bahwa uang adalah modal utama untuk menjadi penguasa politik juga salah. Klaim politik kampanye dengan mobilisasi massa yang sebesar mungkin dengan umbul-umbul politik yang mengepung rakyat--sehingga membutuhkan dana politik yang besar--juga salah. Aliansi antarpartai atau membeli partai sebagai tunggangan politik juga kalah.

Di satu sisi, kita bisa membaca peristiwa itu sebagai sebuah reintegrasi Aceh, dan khususnya GAM, ke dalam sistem politik Indonesia. Lalu, kita bisa berkata-kata: itukah perpolitikan Aceh yang berbeda dengan perpolitikan Indonesia? Di sisi lain, kita pun dapat memahami peristiwa itu sebagai sebentuk revolusi politik. Paling tidak lebih revolusioner daripada capaian politik yang diperoleh dari gerakan Reformasi 1998 secara nasional.

Akibat perubahan politik yang revolusioner itu--sekalipun baru pada tataran pelakunya, belum masuk ke revolusi struktur dan kultur politik di Aceh-- keseluruhan sendi kehidupan di Aceh menjadi goyah. Kaum elite lama khawatir terjungkal. Sebagian besar rakyat yang merasa menang atas dominasi kaum elite lama menggelembungkan harapan hidup barunya pada pemimpin yang baru.

Celakanya, pilkada juga bisa berarti menjebloskan penguasa baru itu ke dalam struktur dan kultur politik, birokrasi, dan keserdaduan yang telah mengakar dengan rumit, yang juga adalah refleksi dari keberhasilan Indonesianisasi di Aceh. Masalahnya, apakah para pelaku politik dari pihak GAM, yang sekarang terintegrasi ke dalam struktur dan kultur politik keindonesiaan itu, mampu mengubah atau justru tenggelam di dalam kerumitan Indonesia.

Dalam perancangan anggaran, penguasa baru belum berhasil merancang sistem anggaran belanja yang sesuai dengan visi dan misinya. Kaum teknokrat dan birokrat yang mendominasi penganggaran masih menyusunnya sesuai dengan mindset yang tak sensitif terhadap kondisi Aceh pascakonflik dan bencana tsunami. Dalam restrukturisasi pemerintahan Aceh, penguasa baru terbentur dengan cara berpikir kaum politikus di parlemen lokal yang tidak melihat Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh sebagai acuan utamanya. Bahkan mereka disekongkoli oleh kaum birokrat yang khawatir terjungkal.

Untuk melihat lebih jauh bagaimana kesederhanaan Aceh didominasi oleh kerumitan Indonesia, Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA) merupakan contoh idealnya. Pada aras politik, penanggung jawab utama seluruh reintegrasi berada di pundak pemerintah RI, baik yang menyangkut GAM maupun korban (rakyat sipil). Hal itu dibunyikan dengan kalimat, "Pemerintah RI dan pemerintah Aceh akan melakukan upaya? Pemerintah RI akan mengalokasikan dana? Pemerintah RI akan mengalokasikan tanah pertanian dan dana?" MOU juga menjelaskan dengan terang benderang apa saja dan siapa saja yang menjadi subyek reintegrasi itu.

Namun, dalam aras implementasinya terjadi dua hal yang merumitkan. Pertama, BRA adalah sebuah lembaga yang dibentuk oleh pemerintah Aceh, bukan oleh pemerintah RI sehingga kewenangannya sulit menjangkau langit-langit kebijakan politik nasional. Beban nasional dilimpahkan menjadi beban daerah, meskipun dengan alokasi dana dari anggaran nasional (APBN). Agenda reintegrasi pun berkelindan dengan agenda dinas sosial.

Kedua, kerumitan semakin menjadi, ketika BRA dibebani hal-hal di luar mandat MOU Helsinki. BRA harus menanggulangi para milisi yang merupakan subyek tak tersebutkan dalam MOU Helsinki. Bahkan BRA menjadi saluran dana bagi Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi (FKK), yang merupakan evolusi dari Desk Aceh di masa perang yang berelasi dengan Menteri Koordinator Politik Hukum dan Keamanan. Hal ini terjadi setelah FKK melibatkan keanggotaan pemimpin GAM di dalamnya. BRA pun tak berdaya memperoleh akuntabilitas pemakaian dana itu dari FKK. Lebih rumit lagi bila benar bahwa pembentukan FKK merupakan siasat politik menyabotase pembentukan Komisi Bersama Penyelesaian Klaim, yang diamanatkan MOU Helsinki namun belum juga dibentuk, sedangkan permasalahan semakin rumit.

Hal lain yang semakin merumitkan adalah pemerintah RI tidak berupaya membuat agenda reintegrasi yang terancang dengan baik (blueprint) bagi Aceh-Indonesia pascaperang. Pertarungan politik internal dibiarkan dan ketidakpuasan para subyek BRA terus menggelembung.

Tampaknya, contoh-contoh di atas sudah cukup untuk menjelaskan bagaimana kerumitan-kerumitan Indonesia yang semakin mengepung Aceh, yang merupakan produk dari pengabaian komitmen-komitmen politiknya sebagaimana yang tercantum dalam MOU. Situasi pun semakin rumit manakala tanggung jawab pemerintah RI untuk memfasilitasi transformasi GAM dari gerakan bersenjata menjadi gerakan politik tidak dilakukan. Apalagi para donor yang terlibat dalam memfasilitasi pemerintahan Aceh maupun GAM sama sekali tidak memahami apa dan bagaimana kesederhanaan Aceh dan kerumitan Indonesia itu. Sementara itu, pelaku-pelaku politik baru di Aceh mulai kehilangan kesadaran akan kesederhanaan Aceh dan mulai terseret ke dalam alam kerumitan Indonesia

17 October 2007

Pornography: The Production and Consumption of Inequality (Paperback)

Book Review

by Gil Dines, Robert Jensen, Ann Russo

A must read for EVERYONE, June 9, 2003

By
Kevin Davis (Charlotte, NC United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)

I say this is a must for everyone because pornography effects everyone (whether you use it or not). This is an honest look into the world of pornography including the producers, consumers, and victims. Since it was written by 3 outspoken liberal feminists (e.g., one author claims to be anti-capitalist, and they all dismiss religious conservatives such as fundamentalists as often hypocritical; not to mention, they make a point of naming the Catholic religion of many of the users and abusers of porn). Even with those quibbles (since I'm a conservative/fundamentalist Baptist, pro-capitalist, and for the most part, anti-feminist), I still highly recommend this book. Beware, however: the illustrations of mainstream porn and the accounts of the victims are very graphic. For those of us who never "got into" the world of hardcore or semi-hardcore pornography, this will be an eye-opener that will make you both sad and disgusted. If you don't have the money to buy this book, please go see if your library has it (like mine). A must read no matter where you are on the left-right social/political spectrum.

In Memoriam Marianne Katoppo: Kepergian "Yang Lain" Itu

Oleh Aryawirawan Simauw

Sabtu siang tanggal 13 Oktober 2007, di tengah keriangan Idul Fitri, angin sepoi-sepoi terasa sendu di Krematorium Oasis Lestari, Tangerang. Pada sebuah oven, jasad Marianne Katoppo dalam dua jam telah menjadi abu berwarna putih. Kesenduan dan keheningan bersatu menghantar Marianne berpulang menuju Sang Khalik. Tak ada suara kucing-kucing yang mengantarnya, mahluk hidup yang selama bertahun-tahun menjadi teman setianya. Tak ada isak-tangis yang berkepanjangan. Suasana sunyi dan teduh, sesunyi dan seteduh hidupnya. Kepergiannya begitu lain. Sepi, sunyi, damai, dan indah.

Sejumlah kalangan yang mendengar kabar berpulangnya Marianne seakan tak percaya. Bagi saya, kepergiannya sangat mengagetkan dan menyesakkan dada. Sebab, seminggu sebelum Marianne berpulang, ia meminta saya datang menengoknya di Bogor, tapi saya tak bisa. Ironisnya, sesungguhnya sejak minggu lalu Marianne sudah setuju untuk menjadi penasihat penulisan cerita dalam film layar lebar yang sedang saya persiapkan, "Ashram Shanti". Sebuah film yang direncanakan diputar 8 Maret 2008, pada Hari Perempuan Internasional, dan sekaligus bagian dari hadiah HUT ke-65 Marianne.

Perempuan yang dilahirkan di Tomohon pada 9 Juni 1943 itu, memiliki sejumlah sahabat. Sejak 1989, saya membangun persahabatan dengannya, melanjutkan persahabatan ayah dan ibu saya. Bersamaan dengan menguatnya tekanan rezim Orde Baru, Marianne adalah sosok pemberani yang luar biasa.

Mungkin tidak banyak yang tahu, bahwa dalam fase perubahan dari 1990 hingga 1998, Marianne memberikan kontribusi bagi percepatan reformasi secara tak langsung. Tulisan-tulisannya di Suara Pembaruan dalam fase itu dan kehadiran di berbagai forum internasional serta kenekatannya mendirikan Forum Demokrasi (1991) bersama Gus Dur dkk adalah kontribusinya yang cerdas.

Marianne yang menulis buku Compassionate and Free pada 1979 dan telah memberi pencerahan di mana-mana, memilih teologi perempuan sebagai teologi pembebasannya. Gelar Sarjana Teologi dari STT Jakarta tidak membuatnya sungkan untuk beradu pandangan dengan teman-teman teolog Indonesia lainnya yang Strata II dan Strata III.

Sebab, dengan kemampuan lebih dari 10 bahasa, penguasaan pengetahuan filsafat, sejarah, politik, sosial, dan ekonomi, Marianne dikenal kalangan luas. Ia juga terlibat berbagai organisasi, mulai dari sebagai anggota Pengurus Pusat Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (1962-1964, 1976-1978), pendiri Kelompok Hapus Hukuman Mati (1980), anggota Pendiri Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologian in Indonesia (1982), anggota United Borad for Christian Education in Asia (1982-1986), anggota Majelis Pekerja Harian Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (1984-1989), dan anggota International Council of World Conference for Religion and Peace (1989-1994).

Teman-temannya bukan saja dari kalangan Protestan, tetapi Katolik dan Ortodoks. Demikian pula dari kalangan Islam, Hindu, Buddha, Khonghucu, Sikh, Brahmana Kumaris, dan Bahai. Keterlibatannya pada pergumulan pluralisme, multikulturalisme dan theologiae religionum tetap pada pilihannya pada teologia perempuan sebagai paradigma berteologia.

 

Realitas Kemanusiaan

Dalam buku peringatan 50 Tahun Sekolah Tinggi Teologia Jakarta tahun 1984, dengan jelas Marianne mengatakan bahwa diperlukan paradigma baru dalam berteologi, yaitu realitas kemanusiaan dan bukan lagi sekadar pewahyuan dari Allah. Marianne sangat yakin harusnya realitas kemanusiaan yang terpecah sekarang ini dan menghasilkan kemiskinan, ketidakadilan, ketidakdamaian, kerusakan lingkungan menjadi titik-tolak berteologia agama-agama dalam menyelesaikan persoalan kekinian kita.

Teriakannya yang keras tentang konsep Imago Dei dalam memperjuangkan kesetaraan, persamaan, pemulihan kemanusiaan, dan hubungan yang hancur dimampatkan dalam konsepnya tentang Liberation Theology Toward Full Humanity. Dan baginya, tugas ini bukan melulu pada satu agama tertentu, tetapi pada agama-agama. Oleh karena itu, selain dikenal sebagai perintis pikiran teologi perempuan di Asia, Marianne juga menggunakan teologia perempuan sebagai karya-karya pembebasan bagi agama-agama menemukan kembali fungsinya sebagai pembebas.

Dalam ranah yang lain, Marianne juga dikenal sebagai seorang novelis dengan kekayaan tema perempuan yang menyentuh. Sebutlah "Dunia Tak Bermusim" (1976), "Raumanen" (1977), dan "Rumah Di Atas Jembatan" (1981). Bahkan novelnya "Raumanen" diganjar Hadiah Yayasan Buku Utama (1978) dan SEA Write Award (1982). Konon, latar kisah dalam novel-novelnya banyak diambil dari pengalaman hidupnya dan teman-temannya. Selain itu, Marianne menerjemahkan karya sastra dari bahasa aslinya ke bahasa Indonesia. Misalnya "Lapar" (Knut Hamsun, Norwegia), "Malam dan Fajar" (Elie Wiesel, Prancis) dan antologi cerpen India dan Thailand.

Namun, karya terbesarnya adalah buku Compassionate and Free. Buku ini ditulis Mei 1979, selama satu bulan dalam bahasa Inggris untuk kepentingan Dewan Gereja-gereja se Dunia. Buku ini telah membawa banyak pencerahan di kalangan perempuan, komunitas dan lembaga di dunia. Seorang teman saya bercerita bahwa ketika mengikuti sebuah workshop teologi feminis, oleh banyak perempuan Marianne dianggap sebagai inspirasi mereka. Juga bagi beberapa peserta dari negara-negara Timur Tengah.

Setelah 28 tahun buku ini ditulis, diterjemahkan ke berbagai bahasa, dipakai sebagai text book mata kuliah teologi feminis, baru pada tahun ini diterjemahkan dalam bahasa Indonesia, diterbitkan oleh sejumlah sahabat perempuannya. Dalam perjalanan pulang kami semua berujar, bahwa setelah 28 tahun bukunya dibungkam di Indonesia dan raga Marianne telah tiada, buku ini menjadi momentum kebangkitan teologi perempuan Indonesia.

Saat ini, Marianne telah tiada. Marianne tahu masih banyak perempuan yang acap dianggap tak ada, tak perlu ada, dan tak lagi ada. Dianggap "yang lain" itu. Tetapi Marianne telah berhasil menyatakan: "Saya mengklaim hak perempuan untuk dibebaskan dari yang Lain yang mengancam itu. Saya menuntut hak perempuan menjadi Yang Lain dalam seluruh kepenuhannya dan dengan berbagai karunianya–Yang Lain, yang bukan merupakan lawan, deviasi, subordinat dari Diri, melainkan dia yang memberikan makna pada Diri". Perempuan "Yang Lain" itu telah tiada, dengan kematian "Yang Lain", tapi kini perjuangan menjadi Diri "pasti lain" jadinya! Marianne, kami akan lanjutkan perjuanganmu!

Penulis adalah pekerja seni, hiburan, media dan penyiaran; pendamping orang dengan HIV/AIDS; pendamping perempuan korban kekerasan

15 October 2007

Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia

Journal article by Zachary Abuza; Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
29, 2007

Review

Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia. By Noorhaidi Hasan. New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006. Softcover: 266pp.

The first time that I met Umar Jafaar Thalib, the first thing that I noticed about him was that he had delicate manicured hands, an eerie juxtaposition to all the bloodshed for which he was responsible. Yet reading through Noorhaidi Hasan's Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia--the first book-length study that charts the decline and fall of one of the most visible symbols of post-Soeharto Islamic militancy--one gets little sense of the sheer brutality or scope of violence that plagued Indonesia's Outer Islands from 1999 to 2002. Much of the violence gets glossed over and many parts of the book are frustrating because very little attention is given to such critical points. But the book, which was based on 18 months of fieldwork and 125 interviews of members of Laskar Jihad, remains a wealth of information.

The book in many ways is much more of an intellectual history of the Salafi movement within Indonesia, and in particular, Jafaar's quest to become the movement's paramount leader. Chapter 4, for example, simply explains the Salafi ideology as it took root in Indonesia. The book begins with an analysis of the rapid emergence of Salafi mosques, madrassa, and halqa' ("study circles"). It ties in local politics with the expansion of Saudi Arabian geopolitics and explains the emergence of what he considers a "new type" of Salafi students, in particular, those who went through Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (LIPIA). Under the constraints of the New Order regime, the nascent Salafi movement in Indonesia was forced to focus on what it considers to be its core mission: da'wah, and eschewing politics and militancy.

Hasan's argument is that the Salafi movement, perhaps more than any other movement in Indonesia, was highly influenced by exogenous factors: the Afghan war, Gulf charity funding, and the first Gulf war.

As Soeharto's legitimacy waned in the 1990s with economic slowdowns and rampant corruption, he turned to the Islamists for support--a move that gave the Salafi movement more space. Yet the Salafi movement remained woefully disparate throughout the 1990s. Hasan explains both the doctrinal schisms and personality contests that kept the Salafis divided (pp. 54-58). To that end, Jafaar turned to the Saudi Arabian Hai'at Kibar al-Ulama (the Committee of Senior Ulama) led by Bin Baz to issue fatwas justifying Thalib's actions, and hence his authority--a tactic Thalib would use again in the coming years to crush his rivals in the Salafi movement (pp. 58-61).

Following a rift within the global Salafi movement over the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia in 1991, Thalib began publishing Salary in 1996, which became his ideological mouthpiece. Hasan argues: "There is little doubt that the monthly Salafy quickly reinforced Thalib's image as a leading Salafi authority in Indonesia" (p. 85). Salafy was followed by a network of pasentren, Ihyaus Sunnah Network, though which Thalib fell out of favour and was ousted.

The move from quietest activities into political activism, always a wedge within the Salafi community between the strict Salafis and the Ikhwanists and Surusist, is charted in Chapter 3. As Hasan notes: "The dramatic shift of the Salafi movement towards political activism and militancy was inseparable from the political ambitions of the movement's leaders who saw that the rapid changes in the Indonesian political landscape would facilitate the orchestration of popular politics and the staging of collective actions" (p. 93). While some of the opening came from the rise of Islamist political leaders following the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, Hasan contends that it was the outbreak of sectarian conflicts that gave the Salafis not just the political opening, but a religious obligation to act--both a personal obligation (fard ayn) and a collective obligation (fard kifaya).

Thalib with other Salafis established Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wah' Jama'ah, the umbrella organization for Laskar Jihad.

Forum Komunikasi questioned the "indifference" of the government to the plight of the Muslims in the Malukus (p. 209), and in particular to President Abdurrahman Wahid's coddling of Christians, communists, and his desire to forge diplomatic relations with Israel. For the conspiracy-minded Thalib, the Malukan conflict was something escalated by a Zionist-American conspiracy to rip apart the Indonesian state (p. 114). Here again, Thalib relied on the fatwas of no less than six leading Salafi clerics in the Middle East to justify the Laskar Jihad's jihad in the Malukus (pp. 116-21). Those fatwas were used to declare President Wahid, the former leader of Nadhalatul Ulama, the world's largest Muslim organization, a kafir (infidel), who had abdicated his responsibility to defend Muslims from aggression. And in doing so, Hasan contends that the Salafis "appointed Thalib as temporary commander of their jihad mission" and ergo "temporary leader whose commands should be followed" (p. 155). Thalib's quest to become the amir of the Salafi movement was one step closer to fulfilment.

Despite extensive fieldwork and interviews, Laskar Jihad is not a quantitative study, but it sheds particular light on the process of exclusion and establishing parallel communities, cut off from secular society, what Hasan labels "enclaves". The author demonstrates how the leaders of Laskar Jihad encouraged members to live apart in terms of dress, norms, behaviour, and language, "a domain in which a resistance identity is created" (p. 181). While he admits that the public sphere of the Salafi movement "belongs only to men" (p. 180), there is little discussion of women's role within Forum Komunikasi and the Salafi community.

The 6 April 2000 meeting in Jakarta between three Laskar Jihad leaders and President Wahid, who refused to sanctify their vigilante defence of the Muslims in the Malukus, marked the start of armed conflict.

Laskar Jihad began military training. Some members of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) appear to have assisted in this process, but what Hasan fails to demonstrate is why the Indonesian government allowed Laskar Jihad to continue the training and then board government-owned ships bound for Ambon, an event that dramatically escalated the violence. The TNI's complicity in supporting Laskar Jihad's activities in Malukus must be understood in the context of what was happening in East Timor, a subject that goes completely unexplained. Far more on the role and involvement of the TNI needs to be researched.

Hasan argues that Laskar Jihad added little to the battlefield in terms of tactics or military skills; indeed, their "achievement in the Moluccas was, in many ways, strikingly limited" (p. 197). In general, Laskar Jihad was there to set up Koranic centres and to take control of abandoned mosques. Hasan rightly notes that much of the fighting was done by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked Laskar Mujahidin, and some foreign fighters, though he explains little about these groups or how they were related with Laskar Jihad. Indeed, there was often significant tension between them.

The March 2001 stoning to death of a member who committed rape was a turning point in the organization. Thalib used his religious authority, again based on a fatwa issued in Saudi Arabia, to  implement shariah, rather than simply calling on followers to obey it. He became known not only as a jihad leader, but also as one of the vanguard who supported comprehensive implementation of the shariah. It was as though he had challenged those who had previously spoken out about the need to return to the Jakarta Charter to step forward and prove their commitment to Islam (p. 199).

Yet again, while explaining the actions and implications, Hasan glosses over what happened on the part of the state: "Partly because of the demands of the aforementioned Muslim organizations, the police released Thalib and changed his legal status to that of house detainee. Following the pre-judicial trial, which determined that his arrest was illegal, the police eventually absolved Thalib of all indictments" (p. 199). This is hardly a convincing and satisfactory answer to why someone who unilaterally challenged the authority of the state was able to literally get away with murder. Likewise, Hasan is really unable to explain why it took the state so long to send troops to the Malukus, in August 2001, though his analysis of the repercussions on Laskar Jihad is quite strong.

There are a few factual errors regarding the JI in his discussion of the post-9/11 environment. There were no arrests of JI members until after the 12 October Bali bombings; indeed the Indonesian government was in an appalling state of denial regarding the scope of Islamic militancy within its borders. Likewise, the author overstates the popularity and resilience of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) which has been in significant retreat since 9/11, as other militant groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI, or Islamic Defender's Front) have intimidated its members, while the quasi-official Ulama's Council of Indonesia (MUI) have issued fatwas branding "liberal Islam" un-Islamic (p. 208).

There are other places that simply begged for a more thorough treatment and analysis. The jihad in Poso got only a paragraph (p. 205), yet the violence continues there to this day, as it does in the Malukus. While the author contends that Laskar Jihad had scant involvement there, the conclusion would have been an apt place to discuss the ongoing legacy of Laskar Jihad. While the group disbanded under the weight of internal factionalism and Thalib's rapid fall from grace, discussed in pages 211-13, the legacy of militant Islam continues to this day. The Indonesian government's apparent reluctance to take on these small laskar groups is troubling.

All too often groups such as Laskar Jihad and the FPI are dismissed as thugs. Hasan's work is integral to our understanding of the profoundly theological nature of these groups. He explains the theological debates and schisms with clarity and consistency. Despite some limitations as mentioned above, Laskar Jihad is very balanced and eminently readable, and will remain the standard reference on the group. It should be read by anyone interested in Islamic militancy in Indonesia.

ZACHARY ABUZA is a Professor in the Department of Political Science
and International Relations, Simmons College, Boston, USA.